Date: 17 October 2013
Court: United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Citation(s): Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1141-46 (9th Cir. 2013)
Short summary
Washington state residents and non-profits sued the Washington State Department of Ecology over its failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the Clean Air Act. The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court below and held that Plaintiffs failed to show standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution by failing to establish causation for and the redressability of their injuries.
Summary by: David Cremins
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Weight of decision
The ruling by the Circuit Court of Appeals holds precedential authority in the Ninth District (Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Hawaii, and Alaska) and persuasive authority in other U.S. Circuits.
Key facts
Washington State has five oil refineries subject to regulation under § 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) and is required by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop a State Implementation Plan (SIP) to define greenhouse gas (GHG) emission limits (known as National Ambient Air Quality Standards [NAAQS]) for these refineries, which accounted for about 6% of Washington’s state emissions in 2008.
Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts have the power to hear “cases and controversies” between parties with an adversarial interest in a judicial ruling. Standing doctrine has been most notably developed in the context of environmental suits by the cases described below.
Previous instances
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), established that environmental plaintiffs must establish 1) a concrete, particular injury they have suffered or will imminently suffer that 2) is causally related to the (in)action of the actor they are suing and 3) that a court order could sufficiently redress their harm.
Massachusetts v. EPA held that GHGs are air pollutants subject to regulation under the CAA, a major win for environmental litigation. However, it also put in place a heightened standard for standing for non-state actors seeking to enforce EPA regulations, e.g., by promulgation of specific NAAQS in states’ SIPs.
Summary of holding
Plaintiffs’ claim (that Washington’s SIP failed to establish NAAQS that limited GHG emissions at key refineries) is not addressable by courts because they lack Article III standing. Non-profit environmental groups and individuals plausibly sustain economic, recreational, and health injuries due to CO2 pollution and attendant climate change. However, the chain of causation between these refineries’ GHG emissions and global climate change is too weak and attenuated to satisfy the second prong of the standing test. Further, any order to regulate these refineries would have a negligible effect on redressing plaintiffs’ localized injuries incurred because of global temperature rise. This is distinguishable from Massachusetts, wherein Massachusetts was afforded relaxed standing requirements due to its status as a quasi-sovereign, thereby satisfying Lujan. This “special solicitude” does not extend to these non-state litigants, and even if it did their claims would still be tenuous.
Potential takeaways for future climate migration litigation
- This case demonstrates the difficulty of achieving standing before United States federal courts in cases concerning specific harms from global climate change. It is one of many cases that could demonstrate this proposition, but it is notable because it involves a liberal-leaning court refusing to enjoin a liberal state from enacting federally mandated regulation of its fossil fuel emissions.
- Such standing issues may not be as prevalent in migration cases where an injury is already established, and a government agency’s action can provide a clear remedy, such as resettlement.