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Daniel Billy et al. v Australia

Date: 22 September 2022

Court: United Nations Human Rights Committee

Citation: Views adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning Communication No. 3624/2019

Short summary 

The indigenous minority group of four low-lying islands in the Torres Strait region, one of the most vulnerable populations to climate change impacts, filed a petition against the Australian government alleging a violation of articles 2, 6, 17, 24 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) due to Australia’s failure to implement measures for mitigation and adaptation to climate change, threatening habitability on the islands and displacement of the Torres Strait Islanders. In finding a violation of articles 17 and 27, the Committee requires Australia to make full reparation to individuals, providing adequate compensation, engaging in meaningful consultation with affected communities for assessment and continue implementing strategies for the safe existence of the islands and their inhabitants.

Summary by: Irene Sacchetti

Link to Original Judgement

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Weight of decision 

Though not legally binding, for the first time the Committee ascertains State’s responsibility for climate inaction leading to a violation of multiple rights, including cultural rights under the ICCPR.

Key facts 

The petitioners’ claims were based on Australia’s failure to implement adaptation strategies (e.g., infrastructure such as sea walls) and mitigation measures to reduce GHG emissions to combat adverse climate change impacts. They argued that sea level rise — already causing coastal erosion – flooding, and the destruction of marine ecosystems and resources all result in violations of Islanders’ rights to life and a healthy environment (article 6), home (article 17), practice cultural traditions on ancestral land (article 27) and intergenerational equity (article 24).

Citing the Teitiota decision, Australia responded that the petitioners “invoke a risk that has not yet materialized” and that “the State party is taking adaptation measures in the Torres Strait, thus rendering the harm invoked by the authors too remote to demonstrate a violation of the right to life.

The Committee was asked to determine whether Australia violated the Covenant by failing to implement adaptation and/or mitigation measures to combat adverse climate change impacts within its territory resulting in harms to the authors’ rights.

Previous instances 

None: The petitioners’ rights under the ICCPR are neither protected by the Australia Constitution nor other domestic legislation – and the highest Court in Australia has ruled that the state have a duty of care to prevent environmental harm – so this was a case of first impression before the Committee.

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Ioane Teitiota decision, CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016

Date of judgement: 23 September 2020

Court: United Nations Human Rights Committee

Citation(s): CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016; Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2728/2016

Short summary 

In its first ruling on a complaint by an individual seeking asylum from the effects of climate change, the United Nations Human Rights Committee found that states may not deport individuals who face climate change-induced conditions that violate the right to life.

Summary by: Makaela Fehlhaber

Link to original Judgement 

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Weight of decision 

This decision is significant in that it is one of the first to acknowledge climate change-induced conditions as drivers of asylum claims. The Committee is responsible for holding states to account for upholding the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, however, its decisions are not binding. 

Key facts

The applicant sought asylum (and in the alternative, to be regarded as a protected person) on environmental grounds and argued that this was within the scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention

Further, the applicant contended that deportation back to Kiribati would violate Art. 6 (the right to life) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The applicant sought determination by the Committee on the basis that he had exhausted all available domestic remedies (para. 8.3), a fact not disputed by the State party. 

New Zealand’s primary arguments surrounded the lack of evidence put forth by the applicant to support the argument that there was an imminent risk to his right to life, and that the claim should be deemed inadmissible. 

The Committee was asked to determine whether New Zealand had breached its obligations under the ICCPR by deporting the applicant back to Kiribati on the basis that the evidence did not support a finding that the applicant would face the risk, or would likely face the risk of arbitrary deprivation of life upon his return to Kiribati. 

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AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413

Date: 25 June 2013

Court: New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal

Citation(s): AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, New Zealand: Immigration and Protection Tribunal, 25 June 2013

Short summary

Sea level rise and storms in Kiribati did not create a claim to protection under the Refugee Convention, the Convention Against Torture, or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These environmental disasters may create circumstances in which persecution can occur, and that persecution might give rise to a protection claim.

Summary by: Joseph Lavelle Wilson

Link to original judgement

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Weight of decision

This is the decision of an administrative tribunal and holds moderate weight within the jurisdiction.

Key facts

AF, a citizen of Kiribati, requested protection and/or refugee status from the government of New Zealand after changes to his home country’s environment caused by sea level rise associated with climate change.

Kiribati is a small nation in the Central Pacific Ocean made up of 33 atolls. The tribunal reviewed evidence regarding the situation in Kiribati. A 2007 National Adaptation Programme of Action filed by Kiribati under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change provided a bleak picture of the impact of sea level rise on the islands of Kiribati. According to the programme the maximum height of the atolls is three-four meters above sea level, flooding and erosion are rife, and the primary source of potable water for most people in Kiribati – lenses of freshwater floating on seawater at the centre of some atolls – is at increasing risk of saltwater intrusion from storm surges.

AF’s testimony about his life in Kiribati was also reviewed by the tribunal. He was born in the 1970s on a small islet north of Tarawa, the main island and capital of Kiribati. He moved to Tarawa after finishing his schooling. In the early 2000s, more people from other atolls began moving to Tarawa, resulting in overcrowding and conflict. Flooding and erosion worsened over time, causing significant hardship to AF and his family. Eventually AF moved to New Zealand where he made his claims for protection.

Summary of holding

Although climate-based claims to protection may be possible, in this case the tribunal found that there was no evidence to support AF’s claim that he had a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of a protected ground, and so his claims to protection were dismissed.

Important judgement points:

  • AF’s evidence about the situation in Kiribati was accepted: The tribunal found that the South Tarawa area of Kiribati was struggling to carry its population due to the compromising effects of population growth and urbanization which were exacerbated by sudden onset environmental events (storms) and slow-onset environmental processes (sea level rise).
  • Internally displaced people cannot meet the requirements of the Refugee Convention: AF submitted that he was an internally displaced person, and that this grounded a right to claim refugee status in New Zealand. The tribunal found that the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement referred to by AF in his argument were a soft-law instrument not relevant to AF’s situation, as he was by definition no longer internally displaced.
  • Persecution within the legal definition of ‘refugee’ requires human agency: The tribunal rejected AF’s formulation of ‘refugee’ as one that was broader than the legal concept of ‘refugee’, which it confirmed requires some aspect of human agency in terms of persecution on one of the five protected grounds. At the same time, the tribunal stated that this doesn’t mean environmental degradation could never create pathways into the Refugee Convention jurisdiction.

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THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION CASE (UNITED STATES VS CANADA)

Date of judgement: 16 April 1938 and 11 March 1941

Citation(s): UN REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS, Trail Smelter case (USA v. Canada), 16. April 1938 and 11. March 1941, Volume III pp. 1905-1982

Short summary 

This arbitration case between the United States (U.S.) and Canada is the foundational decision for the development of the prohibition of significant transboundary environmental damage in international environmental law. 

Summary by: Robert Los

Link to original judgement 

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Weight of decision 

The decision(s) of the Arbitrational Tribunal continue to bear immense weight in the realm of international law.  

Key facts

A zinc and lead smelter operating since 1896 in the Canadian town of Trail in British Columbia, located 16 km from the U.S. border, became the subject of dispute in this case. 

Between 1925 and 1927, two smokestacks were added to the plant. This caused an increase in pollutant emissions, specifically a doubling of sulfur dioxide. This reached U.S. soil in the form of “acid rain” and caused crop failures and damage in the Columbia River Valley (Washington State). Between 1927 and 1935, the U.S. government protested to the Canadian government regarding this damage to the Columbia River Valley. 

In 1928, both governments commissioned the International Joint Commission by the United States and Canada to conduct arbitration proceedings. The Commission submitted its final report in 1931, which proposed that the Canadian government pay damages of $350,000 USD for the damage caused, and that emissions from the Trail plant be limited. 

Canada paid the damages. However, no improvements were seen with regard to pollutant emissions, and the conflict began again. For this reason, in 1935 the Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operation of Smelter at Trail, B.C., was signed, and the parties agreed to have the following questions settled by arbitration:

1. Whether the Trail plant caused any damage to the State of Washington since 1932, and if so what indemnity should be paid?

2. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, whether said damage should be stopped in the future, and if so, to what extent?

3. If the damage should be stopped, what measures should the Trail Smelter adopt? (Possibly subject to conditions or stipulations).

4. What indemnity or compensation, if any, should Canada pay following the answers to questions 2 and 3?

Summary of holding

In its first decision in 1938 regarding the first question, the Arbitration Tribunal determined that Canada had to pay damages to the U.S. government for the years 1932 to 1937. However, this compensation payment only applied to the damage caused to the soil of the Columbia River Valley. The pollution of the air was not considered to be damage, but rather only a transport medium for the exhaust gases. The U.S. also tried to prove damage to forestry, agriculture, and livestock, but the tribunal rejected this for lack of convincing evidence. 

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