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 CAA de Bordeaux, 2ème chambre, 20BX02193, 20BX02195

Date: 18 December 2020

Court: Court of Administrative Appeal of Bordeaux 

Citations: N° 20BX02193, 20BX02195

Short summary  

In this judgement, the Court overturned the deportation order issued by the French department, Prefect of Haute-Garonne (“Prefect”), against Mr. Sheel on the grounds that it would subject him to a real risk of harm and even death given the high levels of air pollution in Bangladesh and the lack of access to adequate health care services, medication, and respiratory assistance equipment. 

Summary by: Jodie Tang 

Link to Original Judgement

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Weight of decision  

Though an individual judgment, this decision holds immense weight in France because it was the first time the courts extended protection to someone fearful of returning home due to environmental conditions.  

Key facts 

Mr. Sheel, a name given to him by the media, is a Bangladeshi national who entered France in 2011 and lodged an asylum application. His application was rejected in 2013, but he was granted a temporary residence permit due to his state of health from 2015 to 2017. In June 2019, the Prefect refused to renew his residence permit and required Mr. Sheel to leave France within 30 days and return to Bangladesh. This decision was overturned by the Administrative Court of Toulouse, which was appealed by the Prefect to the Court of Administrative Appeal of Bordeaux. 

Mr. Sheel suffers from a severe form of asthma and sleep apnea. Throughout his cases, however, the Prefect argued that medical evidence submitted by Mr. Sheel was inadequate to establish that he would not receive appropriate healthcare services in Bangladesh to treat his respiratory disease. He responded that, regardless of where he lived in Bangladesh, he would be unable to access appropriate medication, could not operate respiratory assistance devices in Bangladesh’s hot climate, and would have difficulty avoiding harmful air pollution.

Previous instances

On 15 June 2020, the Administrative Court of Toulouse annulled the decree of 18 June 2019 issued by the Prefect, where he refused to renew Mr. Sheel’s residence permit, ordered him to leave France and return to Bangladesh. The Court also overturned the decision of 5 August 2019 by the Prefect where he refused to grant Mr. Sheel’s request for family reunification with his wife. The Court ordered the Prefect to grant Mr. Sheel a residence permit pursuant to provision 11° of Article L.313-11 of the Code for the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right to Asylum (“Provision 11”) and ordered the State to pay 1,500€ to Mr. Sheel’s counsel.  

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AC (Tuvalu)

Date: 04 June 2014

Court: New Zealand: Immigration Protection Tribunal

Citation: AC (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 800517-520

Short summary  

A family appealed their immigration cases to New Zealand’s Immigration and Protection Tribunal, claiming their rights to life and protection would be violated if returned to Tuvalu because of climate change impacts. The Tribunal dismissed their claims, finding that they could not meet their evidentiary burden in qualifying as protected persons, nor in demonstrating that the government of Tuvalu failed to meet its duty to address the known effects of climate change on its populace.

Summary by: Keri Pflieger 

Link to Original Judgement

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Weight of decision  

The Immigration and Protection Tribunal is an expert forum administered by the New Zealand Ministry of Justice. It primarily assesses immigration and protection claims under New Zealand’s Immigration Act 2009, which codifies the Refugee Convention (§ 129), Convention Against Torture (§ 130), and the ICCPR (§ 131). The Immigration and Protection Tribunal’s decisions hold significant weight in New Zealand. Decisions may only be appealed to the domestic High Court on issues of law. 

Key facts

The Appellants were a Tuvaluan family (husband, wife, and two children) living in New Zealand who appealed the denial of their immigration cases and sought protected person status under New Zealand’s Immigration Act 2009.

The husband and wife each noticed the effects of climate change in Tuvalu, including increased land inundation, sea level rise, difficulties growing food, coastal erosion, and droughts. Prior to their departure from Tuvalu, they lost two late-term pregnancies, one of which they attributed to the quality of medical care in Tuvalu.

The husband and wife left Tuvalu for New Zealand in 2007, after the husband’s family home was demolished and the wife’s workplace shut down from insufficient funding.

The husband expressed fear for his family’s safety if returned to Tuvalu, due to minimal employment opportunities and lack of access to clean drinking water free from contamination. In addition to sharing her husband’s concerns, the wife also feared the quality of medical care facilities and availability of medicine access for her children, sea level rise’s negative effects on vegetation growth, and not having pathways to land ownership.

Previous instances

In November 2012, Appellants applied for refugee and/or protected person status. However, their claims were dismissed on 17 March 2013 by the Refugee Status Branch. Appellants appealed this dismissal under § 194(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 2009 with the Immigration and Protection Tribunal on 03 April 2014. This case, AC (Tuvalu), is the Tribunal’s assessment of that appeal.

AC (Tuvalu) is a joint appeal issued contemporaneously with AD (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 501370-371. Under that appeal, appellants challenged deportation on humanitarian grounds under § 194(5) & (6), and § 196(6) & (7) of the Immigration Act 2009 to prevent separation of the husband’s family living in New Zealand. Appellants succeeded under that appeal.

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AL v. Austria, Appl. No. 7788/11, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 10 May 2012

Date of judgement: 10 May 2012

Court: European Court of Human Rights

Citation(s): A.L. v. Austria, Appl. No. 7788/11, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 10 May 2012

Short summary 

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) reiterated the obligation of Contracting States to protect individuals from deportation which would place them at risk of treatment contrary to Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (prohibition of torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), noting that Contracting States retained the right to control the entry and expulsion of aliens and that there was no obligation to grant political asylum. The ECtHR stressed that to have an indication as to whether an expulsion would violate Art. 3, from now on, an assessment of the situation in the country would have to be carried out, as the historical situation would offer little more than some help towards understanding the present conditions.

Summary by: Yusuf Lahham

Link to original judgement 

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Weight of decision 

The decision handed down by the ECtHR bears significant weight upon the interpretation of Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 

Key facts

A Togolese national (“the applicant”) brought a case against the Republic of Austria seeking to overturn the decisions of the Federal Asylum Office and the Asylum Court in denying him asylum claim and ordering his return to Togo. As a member of the prominent opposition political party, Union des Forces de Changement (UFC), the applicant alleged that upon his return, he would face a risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Art. 3. 

In addition to this, he claimed that he had been threatened by soldiers in Togo during protests organised in a camp for flood victims due the unequal distribution of relief. The applicant further claimed that another Togolese national (“M.A”) had been granted asylum, relying on very similar evidence to that which had been put forward in his application. He argued that on the basis of M.A’s application result, he too should be granted asylum.

Previous instances 

On 6 July 2009, the applicant’s request for asylum and subsidiary protection was denied by the Federal Asylum Office on the basis that his submission of fear and persecution was not credible and appeared to be a fabrication around what had really happened. The Office noted that parliamentary elections had taken place in 2007, with the UFC winning 27 seats, and that although Togo could not be considered a representative democracy, opposition parties were generally free to act. The Office went on to conclude that whilst the applicant had been truthful regarding his account of the flood and the tensions between soldiers within the flood victim camp, the alleged threats and the applicant’s subsequent fear was contradictory to the applicant’s statements. 

In light of the above, the Office rejected the application for asylum and subsidiary protection on the grounds that the persecution awaiting the applicant in Togo was nothing more than speculation on his part, and that there would be no risk of persecution as recognised under Art. 1(A)(2) of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees

On 29th April 2010, the Asylum Court held a hearing to address the applicant’s appeal, which was based upon the following grounds: that he was unaware of the possibility of submitting more than three pieces of evidence, he had issues understanding the interpreter and as such had not given a full account of police violence towards him at the camp, that members of the UFC were still subject to persecution notwithstanding the 2007 parliamentary elections, and that M.A, another organiser of the demonstrations had been granted asylum. The Court held that the applicant’s statements were contradictory and not due to any translation errors. It was also found that the evidence put forward appeared to be fabricated and that no actual violence towards his person had occurred at the camp. The court ordered his expulsion to Togo, and dismissed his claim. 

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N v. United Kingdom, Application No. 26565/05

Date of judgement: 27 May 2008

Court: European Court of Human Rights

Citation(s): N v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 26565/05, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 27 May 2008

Short summary 

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) formerly established a very high threshold for the protection of asylum seekers with severe health conditions under Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human RIghts in the case of an Ugandan woman suffering from HIV. 

Summary by: Claudia Broadhead

Link to original judgement 

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Weight of decision 

The decision handed down by the ECtHR bears significant weight upon the interpretation of Art. 3 right to prevent of inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). See the Paposhvili decision for further elaboration upon this notion. 

Key facts

The applicant was an Ugandan woman who entered the UK in 1998 under a false identity. Within days, she applied for asylum, claiming that she had been raped by the National Resistance Movement in Uganda because she was associated with the Lord’s Resistance Army. She was diagnosed as being HIV positive and developed Kaposi’s sarcoma, an AIDS defining illness. Medication was only available in Uganda at considerable expense and not easily accessible from her hometown. The applicant claimed that her removal to Uganda would violate her Art. 3 ECHR right (prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment).

The Secretary of State refused the asylum claim on 28 March 2001 on grounds of credibility, and also because it was not accepted that the Ugandan authorities were interested in the applicant. The applicant’s Art. 3 claim was also rejected, with the Secretary of State noting that treatment of AIDS in Uganda was comparable to any other African country, and all the major anti-viral drugs were available in Uganda at highly subsidized prices. 

Summary of holding

The ECtHR first stated that AIDS drugs available under the National Health Service (NHS) in the U.K. could also be obtained locally in Uganda, and most were also available at a reduced price through UN-funded projects. The applicant’s return would not, therefore, be to a complete absence of medical treatment, and so would not subject her to acute physical and mental suffering. 

The ECtHR found that the decision to remove someone who is suffering from a serious mental or physical illness to a country where the facilities for the treatment of that illness are inferior to those available in the contracting state may raise an issue under Art. 3, but only in a very exceptional case where the humanitarian grounds against the removal are compelling (para. 42). 

In particular, the court found that for ill-treatment to fall within the scope of Art. 3, it must attain a minimum level of severity that is relative and dependent on all the circumstances of the case, including the duration of treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age, and state of health of the victim.

Further, the ECtHR stated that although advances in medical science – together with social and economic differences between countries – entail that the level of treatment available in the contracting state and the country of origin may vary considerably, Art. 3 does not place an obligation upon the contracting state to alleviate such disparities through the provision of free and unlimited health care to all people without a right to stay within its jurisdiction. 

If humanitarian conditions are solely or predominantly attributable to poverty or to the state’s lack of resources to deal with a naturally occurring phenomenon (in this case HIV illness), the higher threshold of exceptional circumstances is applied and therefore deportation is more likely. 


Potential takeaways for future climate migration litigation

  • Thresholds. In the absence of cases specifically related to climate migration, non-refoulement cases with a medical basis for argument are generally a realistic indicator of thresholds, the interpretation of the articles, and requirements under which protection can be expected from courts. 
  • This case set an absurdly high threshold, and thus should be seen as an unfavourable case for climate migration. For further development (and reduction) of the principles in the case, see the case of Paposhvili v. Belgium.