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Ioane Teitiota decision, CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016

Date of judgement: 23 September 2020

Court: United Nations Human Rights Committee

Citation(s): CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016; Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2728/2016

Short summary 

In its first ruling on a complaint by an individual seeking asylum from the effects of climate change, the United Nations Human Rights Committee found that states may not deport individuals who face climate change-induced conditions that violate the right to life.

Summary by: Makaela Fehlhaber

Link to original Judgement 

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Weight of decision 

This decision is significant in that it is one of the first to acknowledge climate change-induced conditions as drivers of asylum claims. The Committee is responsible for holding states to account for upholding the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, however, its decisions are not binding. 

Key facts

The applicant sought asylum (and in the alternative, to be regarded as a protected person) on environmental grounds and argued that this was within the scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention

Further, the applicant contended that deportation back to Kiribati would violate Art. 6 (the right to life) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The applicant sought determination by the Committee on the basis that he had exhausted all available domestic remedies (para. 8.3), a fact not disputed by the State party. 

New Zealand’s primary arguments surrounded the lack of evidence put forth by the applicant to support the argument that there was an imminent risk to his right to life, and that the claim should be deemed inadmissible. 

The Committee was asked to determine whether New Zealand had breached its obligations under the ICCPR by deporting the applicant back to Kiribati on the basis that the evidence did not support a finding that the applicant would face the risk, or would likely face the risk of arbitrary deprivation of life upon his return to Kiribati. 

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AV (Nepal) [2017] NZIPT 801125, 26 

Date: 22 September 2017 

Court: New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal 

Citation(s): [2017] NZIPT 801125, 26 

Short summary 

Appellants, suffering from PTSD, claimed that they could not return to Nepal due to fear induced by the deadly 2015 earthquake. The Tribunal denied them leave to remain as they had not suffered from persecution resulting from actions of the State and did not meet the definition of a refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention.  

Summary by: Lucas Robinson  

Link to Original Judgement

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Weight of decision 

The New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal (NZPT) is an independent judicial body that was established under § 127 of the Immigration Act 2009. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear appeals against immigration and refugee decisions made by State bodies. As appealing to the High Court can only be made on a point of law, the NZPT decisions carry substantial weight in domestic law. 

Key facts 

Appellants, a married Nepalese couple, appealed the decision made by a refugee and protection officer that they were not to be granted refugee status in New Zealand. They argued that following the April 2015 earthquake in Nepal, they had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and feared the prospect of returning to Kathmandu. The earthquake rendered their home unhabitable and for a period of time they slept in tents. However, although they partly repaired their home, evidence was offered that they often slept on the veranda due to the fear of aftershocks. Appellants argued that they both felt much safer residing in New Zealand where their son and his family had been granted residence status and had purchased a home. Additionally, the Appellants’ General Practitioner gave evidence indicating that the wife did in fact suffer from PTSD and that both of the Appellants suffered from physical injury on account of the earthquake, which had left them in chronic pain for some time.  

Summary of holding 

The Tribunal determined that the relevant tests were set out in the Immigration Act 2009 under § 194(1)(c). Namely, it must be found that appellants are refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention, protected persons under the 1984 Convention Against Torture, or protected persons under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to receive asylum.  

In regard to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it was necessary for the Appellants to show, as per Article 1A(2), that “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted,” they were unable to return to Nepal on account of their “race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social or political group”.  The Tribunal followed the view in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, that “being persecuted” required serious harm arising from the sustained or systemic violation of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection. Additionally, a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there isa real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring (Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379). The Appellants acknowledged that they did not fear the Nepalese state itself, but rather the fear of future earthquakes and the prospect of returning to Kathmandu without the support of their children. In light of this, the Tribunal cited AF (Kribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, a case that set out whilst natural disasters could involve human rights issues, the definition set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention still had to be satisfied.  

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AF (Tuvalu) [2015] NZIPT 800859

Date: 20 October 2015

Court: New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal

Citation: [2015] NZIPT 800859

Short summary

This case was heard before the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal. It is an appeal against the decision taken by a refugee and protection officer to deny refugee status or protected person status to the appellant, a 25-year-old man of Tuvaluan nationality who had been served with a deportation order. The appellant based his appeal on the claim that he had a real chance of being persecuted if returned to his country of nationality in relation to an infringement of his right to work and of his right to safe drinking water. The appellant also claimed that his deportation to Tuvalu would be a violation of his daughters’ rights under the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant could reasonably access clean drinking water and reasonably attempt to gain employment in Tuvalu.

Summary by: Lucas Robinson

Link to original judgement

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Weight of decision

The New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal is an independent judicial body and has jurisdiction to hear appeals against deportations, refugee claims, and other immigration decisions. A decision from the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal can be reviewed by the High Court only if an appeal is made on a point of law. In that sense, the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal’s decisions carry substantial weight in New Zealand domestic law.

Key facts

The appellant was a citizen of Tuvalu, who was 25 years old at the time of the hearing. In 2003, he moved to New Zealand with his mother. This event forced him to drop out of school in Tuvalu. He has been living in New Zealand since then and never went back to school.  In 2008, he married a New Zealand citizen and they had two daughters together. Between 2008 and 2014, the appellant was convicted of multiple offences/crimes in New Zealand. As a result, in July 2014, the appellant was served with a deportation order. In December 2014, the appellant submitted a claim to be recognised as a refugee or as a protected person. A refugee and protection officer denied his claim. This case is the appeal against the aforementioned refusal.

The appellant appealed the decision on three grounds. First, the appellant fears returning to Tuvalu because of the lack of employment opportunities. Indeed, he fears that the government of Tuvalu will discriminate against him due to his criminal convictions and lack of formal education, therefore violating his right to work. Second, the appellant claims that, if returned to his country of nationality, he would not be able to exercise his right to access safe drinking water due to the effects of climate change. Third, the appellant claims that his deportation to Tuvalu would violate his daughters’ rights under the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Previous instances

In July 2014, the appellant was served with a deportation order as a result of his convictions for crimes he committed between 2008 and 2014. His attempt to get this deportation order revoked was unsuccessful. Facing deportation, the appellant submitted an application to be recognised as a refugee or protected person. A refugee and protection officer declined to grant the appellant’s application.

Ontunez Tursios v. Ashcroft

Date: 13 August 2002

Court: United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

Citation: 303 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2002)

Short summary 

A Honduran man, fleeing targeted violence stemming from a land dispute and exacerbated by hurricane damage, was denied refugee status in the United States for failing to establish a nexus between his persecution and the grounds for asylum.

Summary by: David Cremins

Link to Original Judgement

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Weight of decision 

This decision is a binding part of the asylum case law developed in the Fifth Circuit (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) and may be persuasive in other jurisdictions in the United States. 

Key facts

The applicant for asylum, Mr. Ontunez-Tursios, moved to the town of La Ceiba in 1994 and joined other campesinos in cultivating a piece of coastal land known as Las Delicias. In 1996, a group of businessmen, wishing to sell Las Delicias to Korean investors, challenged the campesinos possession of the land, unleashing a campaign of violence and intimidation against them, during which at least two campesinos were assassinated. Mr. Ontunez-Tursios found out he was on a hit list and, after being directly threatened several times, fled to the United States, where he applied for asylum in October 1999.

During this violent dispute over land possession, in October 1998 Hurricane Mitch devastated Honduras, including Las Delicias. The storm ruined Mr. Ontunez-Tursios’ land as well as key documentary evidence against the businessmen pursuing him and the other campesinos.

Previous instances

The immigration judge who first heard Mr. Ontunez-Tursios’ case denied him refugee status because his claim did not arise on account of the enumerated grounds for persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed that he failed to show a nexus between his persecution and either his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, leading to this appeal before the Fifth Circuit.

Summary of holding

In a 2-1 panel decision, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the rulings below, finding that the BIA correctly dismissed Mr. Ontunez-Tursios’ contention that his leadership in the land conflict did not constitute a political opinion or membership in the particular social group of “land rights leaders”. Stripping away the context of land struggle and the impacts of Hurricane Mitch, the court held that his “evidence showed no motive of the persecutors other than a private, economic one.” The court further found that Mr. Ontunez-Tursios did not qualify for withholding of removal because he was at no risk of torture in his home country, and that the Honduran government had not implicitly or explicitly acquiesced to his persecution or torture.


Potential takeaways for future climate migration litigation

  • Increasingly, claims for asylum and other humanitarian protections will have to be considered in the context of climate change. The devastation wrought by Hurricane Mitch in Honduras provides an early example of how an already difficult situation – a violent battle over valuable land between the upper and lower classes in a society – is made worse following disasters. Advocates for climate migrants should note how fights over land and other forms of social violence intermix with a changing climate, including through slow-onset shifts in conditions.
  • As in other cases in jurisdictions around the world, the harm from the climate disaster itself – destruction of land and evidentiary documents – had no bearing on Mr. Ontunez-Tursios’ unsuccessful claim for asylum, even as it exacerbated his vulnerability in his home country.
  • Under United States law, the nexus prong – that persecution must be “on account of” one of the five grounds first laid out in the 1951 Refugee Convention – is often narrowly construed, such that even clear instances of persecutory violence, whether or not connected to climate change, do not qualify even sympathetic applicants such as Mr. Ontunez-Tursios for refugee status.

Montenegro v. Ashcroft

Date: 16 May 2002

Court: United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

Citation: 68 Fed. Appx. 290

Short summary  

A Guatemalan man petitioned for asylum in the United States after suffering persecution attributed to his labour union activity. An immigration judge found his testimony credible and granted the man and his family asylum, a decision ultimately upheld by a federal appeals court.

Summary by: Elisa D’Amico

Link to Original Judgement

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Weight of decision  

This decision is a binding part of the asylum case law developed in the Third Circuit (Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania). Courts outside of the Third Circuit – including immigration and other federal courts – may find the case’s reasoning persuasive when evaluating similar asylum claims.

Key facts 

Werner Montenegro, born in Guatemala on in 1951 and began working as an agricultural internal auditor for a semi-public wheat growers association in 1982. During this period, Montenegro and others organized a labor union, which faced opposition from management led by Carlos Pac. He claimed to have faced assaults and threats in Guatemala due to his involvement in labor union activities, driven by economic scarcity in his sector.

Previous instances  

Immigration Judge Alberto Riefkohl found Montenegro’s testimony credible and granted him, along with his wife and son, asylum, recognizing their need for protection from “a group that the government is unwilling or unable to control.” However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) overturned the Judge’s decision, contending that the harm the family suffered did not meet the threshold for persecution.

Summary of holding 

On Montenegro’s appeal of the BIA decision, a panel of judges on the Third Circuit conducted a thorough examination of Montenegro’s testimony and supporting evidence. Based on evidence of past persecution linked to Montenegro’s labor union involvement, the court concluded that his claim was well-founded and merited protection under asylum laws. The case was remanded back to the Immigration Judge, directing him to grant asylum to Montenegro and his family.

The Third Circuit found that the BIA’s decision lacked proper support from the record, and its characterization of the evidence as “vague” was unjustified. For example, the court highlighted the attack on Mrs. Montenegro, Werner’s wife, which involved threats and physical violence in the presence of their young daughter. The court found this incident to be especially concerning and constituting persecution under the law.

Furthermore, the court explained that once an applicant demonstrates past persecution, as Werner Montenegro did, there is a presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution. The BIA failed to rebut this presumption with evidence showing a fundamental change in circumstances or the possibility of avoiding persecution through relocation. Thus, Montenegro’s eligibility for asylum was firmly established.

Therefore, the court vacated the BIA’s order and remanded the case for the Immigration Judge to grant the application for asylum. The court’s decision ensured that the Montenegro family received the protection they sought, recognizing the persecution they endured in their home country related to Montenegro’s sectoral efforts.


Potential takeaways for future climate migration litigation 

  • Montenegro v. Ashcroft may set precedent for asylum claims based on climate-induced poverty and violence. It recognizes the link between economic migration and persecution, allowing individuals to be granted asylum based on sector- or work-related persecution. This case highlights the significance of considering economic aspects in asylum cases, especially in regions facing resource scarcity and escalating tensions attributable to climate change.
  • As climate change worsens, placing increased pressure on the agricultural sector, this case may gain greater significance for individuals seeking asylum based on persecution associated with their sectoral involvement. By recognizing the impending stress on agricultural sector workers, the case sets a vital standard for courts to consider when evaluating the challenges faced by those displaced within this sector. For example, agricultural workers may confront heightened violence and persecution as a result of escalating resource competition driven by climate change. Challenges also extend to women engaged in informal agricultural work, who find themselves uniquely susceptible to exploitation and harassment amid climate-related internal displacement. Moreover, as climate change renders certain work and livelihoods unmaintainable, climate-afflicted migrants often find themselves moving as economic migrants, seeking alternative opportunities due to the adverse effects of climate change on their traditional occupations.
  • Advocates should also take note of how small-scale and Indigenous farmers face heightened persecution in the context of climate change, leveraging this and similar cases to advocate for more comprehensive asylum frameworks which recognize the nuanced ways environmental degradation, economic precarity, and pre-existing social vulnerabilities contribute to persecution.

Hagi-Mohamed v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1156

Date of judgement: 23 August 2001

 Court: Federal Court of Australia

Citation(s): [2001] FCA 1156

Short summary 

The Federal Court of Australia confirmed that internal relocation must be considered separately from the question of whether a well-founded fear of persecution exists in evaluating claims for protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Summary by: Joseph Lavelle Wilson            


Weight of decision

This decision of the Federal Court bears moderate weight in the Commonwealth of Australia. 

Key facts

Ahmed Dahir Hagi-Mohamed, a citizen of Somalia, arrived in Australia on 15 September 1995. He filed an application for a protection visa under s. 36 of the Australian Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in November 1995, claiming that the Australian government had an obligation to protect him under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (the Convention). The basis of his application was that he had a well-founded fear of persecution in his home country of Somalia, due to his membership of several social groups. 

Hagi-Mohamed claimed that he was a member of the particular social group (that of homosexual men), as well as a member of two clans – the Geledi clan and the Hawadle clan.

Previous instances

The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs and the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) rejected the application for protection. The RRT accepted that each group identified by Hagi-Mohamed was in fact a particular social group, and that he belonged to each one. The RRT found that the motivating reason for the persecution of Geledi clan members by Somalian militias was to take resources from the Geledi clan, specifically arable land and crops, rather than for the reason that they were members of the Geledi clan. The RRT also found that Hagi-Mohamed’s association with his mother’s clan, the Hawadle, did not put him at risk of persecution because there was evidence that other parts of Somalia were controlled by the Hawadle and he could be safe there. With respect to Hagi-Mohamed’s claim based on his homosexuality, the RRT found that although he did belong to the cognisable social group, that group did not face danger rising to the level of persecution under the Convention.

Hagi-Mohamed appealed to the Federal Court of Australia. Justice Stone issued a decision in favour of the government, which was subsequently appealed by Hagi-Mohamed and heard by Justices Wilcox, Weinberg, and Hely in the Federal Court of Australia. 

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