Tag: ClimateChangeInducedMovement

January 17, 2020July 20, 2022

Weight of decision

This decision is significant in that it is one of the first to acknowledge climate change-induced conditions as drivers of asylum claims. The Committee is responsible for holding states to account for upholding the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, however, its decisions are not binding.

Key facts

The applicant sought asylum (and in the alternative, to be regarded as a protected person) on environmental grounds and argued that this was within the scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Further, the applicant contended that deportation back to Kiribati would violate Art. 6 (the right to life) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The applicant sought determination by the Committee on the basis that he had exhausted all available domestic remedies (para. 8.3), a fact not disputed by the State party.

New Zealand’s primary arguments surrounded the lack of evidence put forth by the applicant to support the argument that there was an imminent risk to his right to life, and that the claim should be deemed inadmissible.

The Committee was asked to determine whether New Zealand had breached its obligations under the ICCPR by deporting the applicant back to Kiribati on the basis that the evidence did not support a finding that the applicant would face the risk, or would likely face the risk of arbitrary deprivation of life upon his return to Kiribati.

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Juliana v. United States

Date: 17 January 2020

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Citation(s): Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020)

Short summary

A group of young people sued the United States government for failing to prevent climate change, seeking an order requiring the government to develop a plan to phase out domestic fossil fuel emissions. The plaintiffs claimed violations of their substantive due process, equal protection, the Ninth Amendment, and the public trust doctrine. The court found that the plaintiffs established injury-in-fact and causation for Article III standing but that their claim failed for lack of redressability.

Summary by: Nicole Gasmen and Luke Hancox

November 20, 2019June 9, 2022

Weight of decision

This decision comes from the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals and is therefore binding on all courts in the Circuit and persuasive in other federal courts.

Key facts

The plaintiffs were twenty-one young citizens, an environmental organization, and a “representative of future generations.” [1165] They sued the President (later dismissed from the action), the United States, and federal agencies. The complaint accused the government of continuing to “permit, authorize, and subsidize” [1165] fossil fuel use, despite awareness of its risks, leading to various climate-change-related injuries. The plaintiffs’ claims varied from psychological harm and impairment of recreational interests to exacerbated medical conditions and property damage.

The complaint asserted violations of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights:

“(1) the plaintiffs’ substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) the plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth Amendment to equal protection of the law; (3) the plaintiffs’ rights under the Ninth Amendment; and (4) the public trust doctrine.” [1165]

The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction ordering the government to implement a plan to “phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric [carbon dioxide].” [1165]

The court noted that the District Court record and this appeal recognized climate change is occurring at a rapid pace. The court stated that rising carbon emissions would wreak havoc on the Earth’s climate if left unchecked, and that the federal government long understood these risks and affirmatively contributed to their worsening.

The government largely did not contest the factual basis for the plaintiffs’ claims, only that they lacked standing to pursue them.

Previous instances

The District Court denied the government’s motion to dismiss. That court stated that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue their claims that the government violated their constitutional rights, including a Fifth Amendment right to a “climate system capable of sustaining human life.” [1165] The District Court also found a separate viable “danger-creation due process claim” [1165] based on the government’s lack of regulation on third-party emissions and a public trust doctrine claim.

At summary judgment, the District Court dismissed the President as a defendant and dismissed the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim in part. That court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ Ninth Amendment claims. The government then sought this interlocutory appeal to resolve the standing issue and other grounds for dismissal.

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RAD File No VB9-03573

Date: 20 November 2019

Court: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Appeal Decision

Citation: [2019] RADD No 2229

Summary by: Madison Bruno

Short summary

The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejected a claim for refugee protection because it found an Internal Flight Alternative (IFA), Port Harcourt, within Nigeria. The Appellant claimed that the RPD erred in its IFA test because the alternate location was unsafe and unreasonable. The Refugee Appeal Board dismissed the appeal but accepted evidence regarding effects of climate change in Nigeria.

September 22, 2017July 19, 2022

Weight of decision

The federal Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) gives the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada jurisdiction to hear and decide cases on immigration/refugee matters. Their decisions are persuasive but not binding precedent and are subject to judicial review at the Federal Court.

Key facts

Appellant alleged he was attacked by Fulani Herdsmen in 2016, following several altercations over their cattle drinking from his fishponds. He claimed that he was hospitalized for 14 months. Appellant fled Nigeria in 2018, travelled through the U.S., then arrived in Canada to seek refugee protection.

Canada’s Refugee Protection Division rejected appellant’s initial application for asylum, prompting an appeal to the Refugee Appeal Board.

Summary of holding

The Refugee Appeal Board utilized a two-part legal test for assessing whether appellant had a reasonable Internal Flight Alternative (IFA):

“First, the Board must be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted, and/or no danger of torture, risk to life, or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in the proposed IFA.” (¶ 51)

“Second, conditions in that part of the country must be such that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, for the claimant to seek refuge there.” (¶ 52)

“Once an IFA has been identified, the Appellant is responsible for demonstrating that the IFA is unsafe or unreasonable.” (¶ 53)

The Appeal Board then gave a summary of the documentary evidence regarding Fulani Herdsmen used by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) in its original decision:

“The NDP [National Documentation Package] states that climate change and insecurity in Nigeria’s northern region have triggered a southward migration of Fulani Herdsmen, resulting in conflict between local farmers and the Herdsmen as they search for land to graze their cattle. The conflicts occur primarily in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, including the states of Adamawa, Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, Taraba, and the Federal Capital Territory.” (¶ 55)

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AV (Nepal) [2017] NZIPT 801125, 26

Date: 22 September 2017

Court: New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal

Citation(s): [2017] NZIPT 801125, 26

Short summary

Appellants, suffering from PTSD, claimed that they could not return to Nepal due to fear induced by the deadly 2015 earthquake. The Tribunal denied them leave to remain as they had not suffered from persecution resulting from actions of the State and did not meet the definition of a refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Summary by: Lucas Robinson

October 21, 2016May 9, 2022

Weight of decision

The New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal (NZPT) is an independent judicial body that was established under § 127 of the Immigration Act 2009. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear appeals against immigration and refugee decisions made by State bodies. As appealing to the High Court can only be made on a point of law, the NZPT decisions carry substantial weight in domestic law.

Key facts

Appellants, a married Nepalese couple, appealed the decision made by a refugee and protection officer that they were not to be granted refugee status in New Zealand. They argued that following the April 2015 earthquake in Nepal, they had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and feared the prospect of returning to Kathmandu. The earthquake rendered their home unhabitable and for a period of time they slept in tents. However, although they partly repaired their home, evidence was offered that they often slept on the veranda due to the fear of aftershocks. Appellants argued that they both felt much safer residing in New Zealand where their son and his family had been granted residence status and had purchased a home. Additionally, the Appellants’ General Practitioner gave evidence indicating that the wife did in fact suffer from PTSD and that both of the Appellants suffered from physical injury on account of the earthquake, which had left them in chronic pain for some time.

Summary of holding

The Tribunal determined that the relevant tests were set out in the Immigration Act 2009 under § 194(1)(c). Namely, it must be found that appellants are refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention, protected persons under the 1984 Convention Against Torture, or protected persons under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to receive asylum.

In regard to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it was necessary for the Appellants to show, as per Article 1A(2), that “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted,” they were unable to return to Nepal on account of their “race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social or political group”. The Tribunal followed the view in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, that “being persecuted” required serious harm arising from the sustained or systemic violation of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection. Additionally, a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there isa real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring (Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379). The Appellants acknowledged that they did not fear the Nepalese state itself, but rather the fear of future earthquakes and the prospect of returning to Kathmandu without the support of their children. In light of this, the Tribunal cited AF (Kribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, a case that set out whilst natural disasters could involve human rights issues, the definition set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention still had to be satisfied.

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Beauboeuf v. Canada

Date: 21 October 2016

Court: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Immigration Appeal Division)

Citation(s): 2016 CarswellNat 8691 

Short summary 

A 71-year-old Haitian applicant successfully appealed a refusal letter denying her permanent residency in Canada. While she was originally denied a visa because of the potential for her health conditions to cause excessive demand on health or social services in Canada, she demonstrated compelling humanitarian and compassionate grounds that warranted special relief. A major element of her humanitarian and compassionate claim was the devastation ensuing from the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

Summary by: Erin Levitsky

October 20, 2015November 23, 2022

Weight of decision 

This decision is not binding on Canadian courts because it comes from a tribunal. It is persuasive, however, and the fact that it is an appeal decision gives it greater weight.

Key facts

The appellant, Yamiley Beauboeuf, and her husband were both born in Haiti and are both citizens of Canada. They have two sons who are also Canadian. The family lives in Ottawa.

Following the devastating earthquake in Haiti in 2010, Beauboeuf’s mother, Rose Marie Yolaine Napoléon came to visit her family in Canada and never left. Beauboeuf and her husband co-sponsored Napoléon for permanent residence (PR) as a member of the family.

Previous instances

In October 2012, Napoléon received a procedural fairness letter containing the opinion of a medical officer who determined that her medical condition—diabetic illness complicated by chronic kidney disease—might cause excessive demand on health or social services in Canada. Napoléon provided additional submissions and documents but Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) ultimately issued a refusal letter in April 13 refusing her PR citing the same concern, pursuant to § 38(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). Beauboeuf appealed the decision.

Summary of holding

Rather than contest the legal validity of the refusal letter, the appellant argued there were “sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations, taking into account the best interests of the children directly affected by the decision and the other relevant circumstances of her case” (¶ 3) to justify special relief pursuant to ¶ 67(1)(c) of the IRPA. The Minister argued the threshold for relief based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds was not met.

The Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) allowed the appeal, holding that while the refusal letter was legally valid, the humanitarian and compassionate considerations put forward were sufficient to warrant special relief.

The IAD considered several factors to determine whether humanitarian and compassionate considerations were sufficient, including:

“(i) the relationship of the sponsor to the applicant and the strength of that relationship; (ii) the reasons for the sponsorship; (iii) the overall situation of both the sponsor and the applicant; (iv) the family support in Canada; (v) the existence of dependency as between the applicant and the sponsor; (vi) the best interests of any children directly affected by the decision; and (vii) the objectives of the IRPA” (¶ 5).

The IAD considered the fact that the main reason Beauboeuf sponsored her mother was to keep her alive. It held that being deported would be akin to a death sentence, as dialysis, the medical treatment she required, was not available in Haiti.

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AF (Tuvalu) [2015] NZIPT 800859

Date: 20 October 2015

Court: New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal

Citation: [2015] NZIPT 800859

Short summary

This case was heard before the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal. It is an appeal against the decision taken by a refugee and protection officer to deny refugee status or protected person status to the appellant, a 25-year-old man of Tuvaluan nationality who had been served with a deportation order. The appellant based his appeal on the claim that he had a real chance of being persecuted if returned to his country of nationality in relation to an infringement of his right to work and of his right to safe drinking water. The appellant also claimed that his deportation to Tuvalu would be a violation of his daughters’ rights under the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant could reasonably access clean drinking water and reasonably attempt to gain employment in Tuvalu.

Summary by: Lucas Robinson

June 25, 2013October 17, 2022

Weight of decision

The New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal is an independent judicial body and has jurisdiction to hear appeals against deportations, refugee claims, and other immigration decisions. A decision from the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal can be reviewed by the High Court only if an appeal is made on a point of law. In that sense, the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal’s decisions carry substantial weight in New Zealand domestic law.

Key facts

The appellant was a citizen of Tuvalu, who was 25 years old at the time of the hearing. In 2003, he moved to New Zealand with his mother. This event forced him to drop out of school in Tuvalu. He has been living in New Zealand since then and never went back to school. In 2008, he married a New Zealand citizen and they had two daughters together. Between 2008 and 2014, the appellant was convicted of multiple offences/crimes in New Zealand. As a result, in July 2014, the appellant was served with a deportation order. In December 2014, the appellant submitted a claim to be recognised as a refugee or as a protected person. A refugee and protection officer denied his claim. This case is the appeal against the aforementioned refusal.

The appellant appealed the decision on three grounds. First, the appellant fears returning to Tuvalu because of the lack of employment opportunities. Indeed, he fears that the government of Tuvalu will discriminate against him due to his criminal convictions and lack of formal education, therefore violating his right to work. Second, the appellant claims that, if returned to his country of nationality, he would not be able to exercise his right to access safe drinking water due to the effects of climate change. Third, the appellant claims that his deportation to Tuvalu would violate his daughters’ rights under the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Previous instances

In July 2014, the appellant was served with a deportation order as a result of his convictions for crimes he committed between 2008 and 2014. His attempt to get this deportation order revoked was unsuccessful. Facing deportation, the appellant submitted an application to be recognised as a refugee or protected person. A refugee and protection officer declined to grant the appellant’s application.

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AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413

Date: 25 June 2013

Court: New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal

Citation(s): AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, New Zealand: Immigration and Protection Tribunal, 25 June 2013

Short summary

Sea level rise and storms in Kiribati did not create a claim to protection under the Refugee Convention, the Convention Against Torture, or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These environmental disasters may create circumstances in which persecution can occur, and that persecution might give rise to a protection claim.

Summary by: Joseph Lavelle Wilson

Link to original judgement

December 11, 2012June 22, 2022

Weight of decision

This is the decision of an administrative tribunal and holds moderate weight within the jurisdiction.

Key facts

AF, a citizen of Kiribati, requested protection and/or refugee status from the government of New Zealand after changes to his home country’s environment caused by sea level rise associated with climate change.

Kiribati is a small nation in the Central Pacific Ocean made up of 33 atolls. The tribunal reviewed evidence regarding the situation in Kiribati. A 2007 National Adaptation Programme of Action filed by Kiribati under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change provided a bleak picture of the impact of sea level rise on the islands of Kiribati. According to the programme the maximum height of the atolls is three-four meters above sea level, flooding and erosion are rife, and the primary source of potable water for most people in Kiribati – lenses of freshwater floating on seawater at the centre of some atolls – is at increasing risk of saltwater intrusion from storm surges.

AF’s testimony about his life in Kiribati was also reviewed by the tribunal. He was born in the 1970s on a small islet north of Tarawa, the main island and capital of Kiribati. He moved to Tarawa after finishing his schooling. In the early 2000s, more people from other atolls began moving to Tarawa, resulting in overcrowding and conflict. Flooding and erosion worsened over time, causing significant hardship to AF and his family. Eventually AF moved to New Zealand where he made his claims for protection.

Summary of holding

Although climate-based claims to protection may be possible, in this case the tribunal found that there was no evidence to support AF’s claim that he had a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of a protected ground, and so his claims to protection were dismissed.

Important judgement points:

AF’s evidence about the situation in Kiribati was accepted: The tribunal found that the South Tarawa area of Kiribati was struggling to carry its population due to the compromising effects of population growth and urbanization which were exacerbated by sudden onset environmental events (storms) and slow-onset environmental processes (sea level rise).
Internally displaced people cannot meet the requirements of the Refugee Convention: AF submitted that he was an internally displaced person, and that this grounded a right to claim refugee status in New Zealand. The tribunal found that the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement referred to by AF in his argument were a soft-law instrument not relevant to AF’s situation, as he was by definition no longer internally displaced.
Persecution within the legal definition of ‘refugee’ requires human agency: The tribunal rejected AF’s formulation of ‘refugee’ as one that was broader than the legal concept of ‘refugee’, which it confirmed requires some aspect of human agency in terms of persecution on one of the five protected grounds. At the same time, the tribunal stated that this doesn’t mean environmental degradation could never create pathways into the Refugee Convention jurisdiction.

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Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom

Date: 11 December 2012

Court: European Court of Human Rights

Citation(s): Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom, ECHR, Application no. 35622/04 (11 December 2012)

Short summary

Former inhabitants of the Chagos Islands and their descendants brought an action to contest the U.K.’s bar on resettling the islands. The European Court of Human Rights affirmed previous judgments from U.K. courts barring the plaintiffs’ petitions for resettlement, in part due to the risks of climate change to the Islands.

Summary by: Luke Hancox

September 12, 2012November 23, 2022

Weight of decision

The European Court of Human Rights is the sole body positioned to adjudge claims lodged under the European Convention on Human Rights. Its rulings are generally, though not universally, recognized as valid and enforceable by European parties to the Convention.

Key facts

Between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, the United Kingdom enacted legislation to expel or bar the return of the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands. This was done to facilitate the construction of a United States military base on the island of Diego Garcia. This action was brought by those former inhabitants and their descendants (1,786 people). The applicants brought their action under Articles 6 & 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).

The litigation of this case involves multiple cases in domestic U.K. courts over the past 50 years regarding the events surrounding the colonization and eventual expulsion of inhabitants of the Chagos Islands.

On 8 November 1965, the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) Order in Council (SI 1965/120) established a new colony, including the Chagos Islands and other islands formerly part of the Colony of Mauritius and of the Seychelles. When agreeing to give the U.S. military access to the islands, the

U.K. treated the islands as having no permanent population in order to avoid obligations under the United Nations Charter. They claimed the population was overwhelmingly migrant workers who no longer had jobs because the plantation operated on the islands had been acquired by the U.K. government to transfer to the U.S.

As a result of the above acquisition, the islands’ inhabitants were evacuated. The BIOT Commissioner passed an ordinance in 1971, making it unlawful and a criminal offense for anyone to enter or remain in the territory without a permit. The evacuation caused immeasurable damage to these communities by uprooting their lives and forcing resettlement elsewhere. The U.K. government paid 650,000 pounds sterling (GBP) to Mauritius to aid the resettlement effort.

A 1975 case brought in the High Court of London led the U.K. government to settle all claims with the islanders. The settlement resulted in monthly payments of 2,976 GBP a month to 1,344 Chagossians between 1982 and 1984. In 2000, a case challenging the 1971 Order was brought in London. The court held that the islanders had no permanent right to the land or its use but that the Order was nevertheless invalid as outside the scope of authority of the BIOT Commissioner. This led to the bar on entry to the islands by the former inhabitants being lifted. However, none of these inhabitants went to live on the islands afterward. The U.K. government also began a study to determine the viability of resettlement of the islands after this case.

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Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.

Date: 12 September 2012

Court: US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Citation: 696 F.3d 849

Short summary

The Village of Kivalina, a self-governing, federally recognized tribe of Inupiat Native Alaskans, together with the City of Kivalina, brought action against twenty-four oil, energy, and utility companies for federal common law nuisance, based on emission of greenhouse gases which contributed to global warming, causing the erosion of arctic sea ice and the displacement of the inhabitants. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), contending that Plaintiff’s claims were non-justiciable political questions and that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Summary by: Jane Kundl

December 10, 2009February 9, 2023

Weight of decision

Binding on the Ninth Circuit in the United States, persuasive authority for other circuits and state courts.

Key facts

Kivalina is a small city located on the tip of a six-mile barrier reef on the northwest coast of Alaska, approximately 70 miles north of the Arctic Circle. The Village of Kivalina is a federally-recognized tribe of Inupiat Native Alaskans who live in the municipality. Of 400 residents, 97 percent were indigenous Alaskans. Sea ice that forms a coastline in the fall, winter, and spring protected the land from storms and erosion. But as the sea ice became thinner, formed later, and broke up earlier, erosion and damage to property from sea storms has increased, threatening the entire city and requiring relocation of inhabitants.

Kivalina’s claim was based on greenhouse gas emissions leading to global warming which in turn caused the reduction in sea ice. They argued that the defendants, 24 oil, gas, and utility companies, (the “Energy Producers”) contributed substantially to global warming and thus were responsible for their injuries. They brought a claim under federal common law nuisance, alleging that the production of greenhouse gas emissions constitutes “a substantial and unreasonable interference with public rights, including the rights to use and enjoy public and private property in Kivalina.” (p. 854). State law claims of concert of action and conspiracy to mislead were brought as well. Because the federal law claim was dismissed, the merits of the state law claims were not addressed.

Previous instances

The lower court, the US District Court of Northern California, Oakland Division, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on two grounds:

First, that the issue of greenhouse gases causing global warming was an inherently non-justiciable political question, because the court would have to make determinations regarding energy and environmental policy without guidance from the political branches.
Second, that Kivalina lacked Article III standing as they presented no facts showing the injuries were “fairly traceable” to the actions of the Energy Producers. Plaintiffs could not establish the “substantial likelihood” or “seed” causation standards. The court also concluded that Kivalina’s injury was too geographically remote from the source of harm to infer causation.

Plaintiffs appealed and the Ninth Circuit court upheld the motion. Plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court which was denied.

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Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia 1168

Date: 10 December 2009

Court: Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia

Citation(s): 0907346 [2009] RRTA 1168

Short summary

Australia does not have an obligation to accept climate migrants with no fear of specific persecution in their home country as refugees under its domestic adoption of the Refugee Convention.

Summary by: Lucas Robinson