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Tag: ClimateChange

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Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon 

Date: 17 October 2013 

Court: United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

Citation(s): Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1141-46 (9th Cir. 2013) 

Short summary  

Washington state residents and non-profits sued the Washington State Department of Ecology over its failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the Clean Air Act. The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court below and held that Plaintiffs failed to show standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution by failing to establish causation for and the redressability of their injuries. 

Summary by: David Cremins

Link to Original Judgement

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

The ruling by the Circuit Court of Appeals holds precedential authority in the Ninth District (Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Hawaii, and Alaska) and persuasive authority in other U.S. Circuits.  

Key facts 

Washington State has five oil refineries subject to regulation under § 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) and is required by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop a State Implementation Plan (SIP) to define greenhouse gas (GHG) emission limits (known as National Ambient Air Quality Standards [NAAQS]) for these refineries, which accounted for about 6% of Washington’s state emissions in 2008.  

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts have the power to hear “cases and controversies” between parties with an adversarial interest in a judicial ruling. Standing doctrine has been most notably developed in the context of environmental suits by the cases described below. 

Previous instances  

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), established that environmental plaintiffs must establish 1) a concrete, particular injury they have suffered or will imminently suffer that 2) is causally related to the (in)action of the actor they are suing and 3) that a court order could sufficiently redress their harm.  

Massachusetts v. EPA held that GHGs are air pollutants subject to regulation under the CAA, a major win for environmental litigation. However, it also put in place a heightened standard for standing for non-state actors seeking to enforce EPA regulations, e.g., by promulgation of specific NAAQS in states’ SIPs.  

Summary of holding 

Plaintiffs’ claim (that Washington’s SIP failed to establish NAAQS that limited GHG emissions at key refineries) is not addressable by courts because they lack Article III standing. Non-profit environmental groups and individuals plausibly sustain economic, recreational, and health injuries due to CO2 pollution and attendant climate change. However, the chain of causation between these refineries’ GHG emissions and global climate change is too weak and attenuated to satisfy the second prong of the standing test. Further, any order to regulate these refineries would have a negligible effect on redressing plaintiffs’ localized injuries incurred because of global temperature rise. This is distinguishable from Massachusetts, wherein Massachusetts was afforded relaxed standing requirements due to its status as a quasi-sovereign, thereby satisfying Lujan. This “special solicitude” does not extend to these non-state litigants, and even if it did their claims would still be tenuous. 

Potential takeaways for future climate migration litigation 

  • This case demonstrates the difficulty of achieving standing before United States federal courts in cases concerning specific harms from global climate change. It is one of many cases that could demonstrate this proposition, but it is notable because it involves a liberal-leaning court refusing to enjoin a liberal state from enacting federally mandated regulation of its fossil fuel emissions.  
  • Such standing issues may not be as prevalent in migration cases where an injury is already established, and a government agency’s action can provide a clear remedy, such as resettlement.  
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Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom 

Date: 11 December 2012 

Court: European Court of Human Rights 

Citation(s): Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom, ECHR, Application no. 35622/04 (11 December 2012) 

Short summary  

Former inhabitants of the Chagos Islands and their descendants brought an action to contest the U.K.’s bar on resettling the islands. The European Court of Human Rights affirmed previous judgments from U.K. courts barring the plaintiffs’ petitions for resettlement, in part due to the risks of climate change to the Islands. 

Summary by: Luke Hancox 

Link to Original Judgement

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

The European Court of Human Rights is the sole body positioned to adjudge claims lodged under the European Convention on Human Rights. Its rulings are generally, though not universally, recognized as valid and enforceable by European parties to the Convention.  

Key facts 

Between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, the United Kingdom enacted legislation to expel or bar the return of the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands. This was done to facilitate the construction of a United States military base on the island of Diego Garcia. This action was brought by those former inhabitants and their descendants (1,786 people). The applicants brought their action under Articles 6 & 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). 

The litigation of this case involves multiple cases in domestic U.K. courts over the past 50 years regarding the events surrounding the colonization and eventual expulsion of inhabitants of the Chagos Islands. 

On 8 November 1965, the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) Order in Council (SI 1965/120) established a new colony, including the Chagos Islands and other islands formerly part of the Colony of Mauritius and of the Seychelles. When agreeing to give the U.S. military access to the islands, the

U.K. treated the islands as having no permanent population in order to avoid obligations under the United Nations Charter. They claimed the population was overwhelmingly migrant workers who no longer had jobs because the plantation operated on the islands had been acquired by the U.K. government to transfer to the U.S. 

As a result of the above acquisition, the islands’ inhabitants were evacuated. The BIOT Commissioner passed an ordinance in 1971, making it unlawful and a criminal offense for anyone to enter or remain in the territory without a permit. The evacuation caused immeasurable damage to these communities by uprooting their lives and forcing resettlement elsewhere. The U.K. government paid 650,000 pounds sterling (GBP) to Mauritius to aid the resettlement effort.  

A 1975 case brought in the High Court of London led the U.K. government to settle all claims with the islanders. The settlement resulted in monthly payments of 2,976 GBP a month to 1,344 Chagossians between 1982 and 1984. In 2000, a case challenging the 1971 Order was brought in London. The court held that the islanders had no permanent right to the land or its use but that the Order was nevertheless invalid as outside the scope of authority of the BIOT Commissioner. This led to the bar on entry to the islands by the former inhabitants being lifted. However, none of these inhabitants went to live on the islands afterward. The U.K. government also began a study to determine the viability of resettlement of the islands after this case. 

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Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.

Date: 12 September 2012

Court: US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Citation: 696 F.3d 849

Short summary

The Village of Kivalina, a self-governing, federally recognized tribe of Inupiat Native Alaskans, together with the City of Kivalina, brought action against twenty-four oil, energy, and utility companies for federal common law nuisance, based on emission of greenhouse gases which contributed to global warming, causing the erosion of arctic sea ice and the displacement of the inhabitants. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), contending that Plaintiff’s claims were non-justiciable political questions and that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Summary by: Jane Kundl

Link to original judgement

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Weight of decision

Binding on the Ninth Circuit in the United States, persuasive authority for other circuits and state courts.

Key facts

Kivalina is a small city located on the tip of a six-mile barrier reef on the northwest coast of Alaska, approximately 70 miles north of the Arctic Circle. The Village of Kivalina is a federally-recognized tribe of Inupiat Native Alaskans who live in the municipality. Of 400 residents, 97 percent were indigenous Alaskans. Sea ice that forms a coastline in the fall, winter, and spring protected the land from storms and erosion. But as the sea ice became thinner, formed later, and broke up earlier, erosion and damage to property from sea storms has increased, threatening the entire city and requiring relocation of inhabitants.

Kivalina’s claim was based on greenhouse gas emissions leading to global warming which in turn caused the reduction in sea ice. They argued that the defendants, 24 oil, gas, and utility companies, (the “Energy Producers”) contributed substantially to global warming and thus were responsible for their injuries. They brought a claim under federal common law nuisance, alleging that the production of greenhouse gas emissions constitutes “a substantial and unreasonable interference with public rights, including the rights to use and enjoy public and private property in Kivalina.” (p. 854). State law claims of concert of action and conspiracy to mislead were brought as well. Because the federal law claim was dismissed, the merits of the state law claims were not addressed.

Previous instances

The lower court, the US District Court of Northern California, Oakland Division, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on two grounds:

  • First, that the issue of greenhouse gases causing global warming was an inherently non-justiciable political question, because the court would have to make determinations regarding energy and environmental policy without guidance from the political branches.
  • Second, that Kivalina lacked Article III standing as they presented no facts showing the injuries were “fairly traceable” to the actions of the Energy Producers. Plaintiffs could not establish the “substantial likelihood” or “seed” causation standards. The court also concluded that Kivalina’s injury was too geographically remote from the source of harm to infer causation.

Plaintiffs appealed and the Ninth Circuit court upheld the motion. Plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court which was denied.

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Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia

Date: 28 February 2012 

Court: European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg  

Citation: [2012] ECtHR 338 (Application No. 17423/05)

Short summary  

Six Russian applicants brought a case before the European Court of Human Rights because their government failed to protect their property and possessions from a dangerous flood. The Court held that Russia violated these applicants’ rights under the European Convention on Human Rights by failing to take preventative measures and warn them of the risk of flooding.  

Summary by: Yusuf Lahham 

Link to Original Judgement

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) applies the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and all Contracting States are bound by its judgments. As this case originated in an application against the Russian Federation, a then Contracting State to the ECHR, the judgment had the weight of directly applicable constitutional law in Russia. ECtHR decisions are also relevant to other States as they are viewed as a ‘living interpretation’ of the ECHR.  

Key facts 

The applicants, six Russian nationals, brought complaints to the ECtHR between the 21st of April and the 2nd of September 2005, relying on Articles 2, 8, and 13 of the ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol 1. The applicants live near the city of Vladivostok, in an area near the Pionerskaya river and water reservoir, which was heavily affected by a flash flood in August 2001. The applicants alleged that Russian authorities were responsible for the flood and that there had been inadequate judicial response afterwards.    

Vladivostok is located on the southeast coast of Russia, giving it a monsoon-influenced continental climate with humid summers. The month of August is often the rainiest and is marked by typhoons, and it is widely known that the floodplain of the Pionerskaya river is subject to periodic flooding during heavy rains. Between the 7th of June 1999 and the 27th of July 2001, various different authorities in charge of the reservoir and of the region highlighted the fact that the river channel was blocked and needed to be emptied to ensure that no dangerous flooding would occur. However, despite the various different warnings and orders to act, it is unclear whether any significant measures were actually taken.     

On the 7th of August 2001, a heavy rainstorm affected the area. It is estimated that the rain that fell was the equivalent of a full month’s rainfall. By 12 PM, the reservoir was releasing water at a rate of 167 cubic metres per second. Due to the sudden release of water from the reservoir, a nearby area was immediately flooded, engulfing the applicants’ homes. There was no local emergency warning in place and the water rose quickly to a level of 1.50 metres. All 6 applicants suffered damages to their properties and their possessions.      

Previous instances  

A criminal investigation was opened on the 9th of August 2001, and the director of the State-owned company which regulated the reservoir (the Water Company) had criminal proceedings brought against him. However, in January 2003, the criminal proceedings were discontinued. It was contended that the evacuation of water from the reservoir was appropriate given how much rain had fallen on that day, and that such an evacuation was necessary to mitigate the risk of the dam breaking and claiming many lives. An expert report, concluded in January 2003, found that the main reason for the flood was to the blocked channel of the Pionerskaya river, which was littered with waste and overgrown trees and bushes. Consequently, the investigative authorities ordered criminal proceedings to be brought against officials in Vladivostok. Proceedings were brought against officials on the grounds that they had given permission for housing construction in a water protected zone by the river. However, in July 2004, these proceedings were also discontinued for lack of evidence. The civil proceedings the applicants brought were also dismissed in 2004, leaving them with minimal compensation for their losses.  

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American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut 

Date: 20 June 2011 

Court: United States Supreme Court 

Citation(s): Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) 

Short summary  

Individuals and groups sued electric companies emitting large amounts of carbon dioxide on federal common law grounds. The Supreme court unanimously ruled that, under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency has the exclusive authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, displacing any claims against polluters that seek direct judicial regulation.  

Summary by: Gazal Gupta

Link to Original Judgement

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

This decision is binding on all United States federal and state courts.  

Key facts 

Several non-profit groups and states claimed violations of federal common law against five private energy corporations emitting significant greenhouse gases (GHGs) (650 million annual tonnes as a group). Plaintiffs argued that significant contributions to global warming constituted interstate nuisance and allowed them to seek a court order limiting GHG emissions from Defendant’s plants. Defendants responded that, under the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has exclusive authority to regulate GHGs.  

Previous instances  

Since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), there has been no general federal common law recognized by courts in the United States. 

In Massachusetts v. EPA, carbon dioxide and other GHGs were held to fall within the scope of the CAA for regulation by EPA, and states were granted standing to sue for harms incurred by climate change.  

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court which first heard this case and ruled that petitioners had standing and stated administrable nuisance claims not pre-empted by the grant of regulatory authority to the EPA under the CAA. 

Summary of holding 

On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit on petitioner’s standing but unanimously reversed on the administrability of their claims, holding that § 202(a) of the CAA displaced federal common law by granting the EPA the sole power to regulate GHGs. 

Potential takeaways for future climate migration litigation 

  • Creative legal strategies invoking older traditions from federal common law in the United States are unlikely to succeed, especially when a certain field of regulation or enforcement has been occupied by an agency such as the EPA. Harms incurred by climate change should be litigated primarily on statutory grounds in the United States. 
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Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia 1168 

Date: 10 December 2009  

Court: Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia

Citation(s): 0907346 [2009] RRTA 1168

Short summary 

Australia does not have an obligation to accept climate migrants with no fear of specific persecution in their home country as refugees under its domestic adoption of the Refugee Convention. 

Summary by: Lucas Robinson  

Link to Original Judgement

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision 

This decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia bears moderate weight in immigration cases in the Commonwealth of Australia. 

Key facts 

The applicant was a citizen of Kiribati who arrived in Australia in 2007 and applied for a Protection visa under §65 of the Migration Act 1958 in May 2009. The application was denied by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship in August 2009. 

The applicant claimed that the environmental and economic changes in Kiribati caused by rising sea levels made it impossible for him to earn a living there. In his application, he claimed that some of the islands in Kiribati had already disappeared, and saltwater was springing up through the ground and spoiling the drinking well water, as well as devastating food crops. The applicant’s health had been directly impacted because of the loss of food crops on Kiribati.  

The applicant submitted that these impacts on him constituted persecution that should trigger protections under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Migration Act 1958.  

Previous instances

The application for review by the RRTA was sought after the decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection Visa under §65 of the Migration Act 1958. 

Summary of holding 

The RRTA affirmed the Minister’s decision not to grant the applicant a Protection Visa, finding that in the absence of a discriminatory motivation, Australia’s protection obligations were not triggered. The Tribunal held found that the continued production of carbon emissions that cause climate change is not sufficient to constitute persecution under the Refugee Convention as there was no evidence that the persecution the applicant was fearing was occurring because of his membership to any particular group (or any other protected ground for refugee status). People affected by climate change were not recognized as a cognizable group of people in need of protection. Because the applicant was not part of a particular group, he did not fit the convention definition of a refugee. 

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Massachusetts v. EPA

Date: 2 April 2007 

Court: Supreme Court of the United States 

Citation(s): Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) 

Short summary  

Massachusetts, as well as individual and organizational petitioners, sued the Environmental Protection Agency for its refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the authority granted it by the Clean Air Act. A narrowly divided United States Supreme Court ruled that Massachusetts had standing in the suit, and that the Agency neglected its statutory duty to regulate air pollutants, including carbon dioxide, which contribute to global warming.  

Summary by: Vaughn Rajah  

Link to Original Judgement

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

This decision is binding on all United States federal and state courts. However, it has already been curtailed in subsequent cases. See West Virginia v. EPA.

Key facts 

In 1999, private organisations filed a rulemaking petition asking the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to begin regulating emissions of four greenhouse gases (GHGs), including carbon dioxide (CO2), under § 202(a)(1) of 42 U.S.C.S. § 7521(a)(1), the Clean Air Act (CAA). The CAA requires EPA to prescribe standards applicable to emission of “any air pollutant” from any class of new motor vehicles which, in the EPA Administrator’s judgment, caused or contributed to air pollution reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. In 2003, EPA under the Bush Administration issued an order denying the petition, asserting that the CAA did not authorise EPA to address global climate change and that, in any event, executive policy addressing global warming warranted EPA’s refusal to regulate in such area.  

Previous instances  

Private organisations, joined by intervenor states and local governments, sought review of EPA’s order refusing rulemaking in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which denied review, and then appealed to the Supreme Court. 

One reason the D.C. Circuit denied hearing was its internal split on standing. Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts have the power to hear “cases and controversies” between parties with an adversarial interest in a judicial ruling. Standing doctrine had, prior to Massachusetts, been most notably developed in the context of environmental suits by Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Lujan established that environmental plaintiffs must show 1) a concrete, particular injury they have suffered or will imminently suffer that 2) is causally related to the (in)action of the actor they are suing and 3) that a court order could sufficiently redress their harm.  

Summary of holding 

The questions before the Court were: Do any of the petitioners have standing to challenge EPA’s order refusing to make a rule regulating GHGs? If so, must the EPA regulate emissions of GHGs?  

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Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa v. Paraguay 

Date: 17 June 2005 

Court: Inter-American Court of Human Rights 

Citation(s): IACHR Series C no 125 (Official Case No) IHRL 1509 (IACHR 2005) 

Short summary  

The Yakye Axa Indigenous Community brought a complaint against the state of Paraguay, alleging failure to acknowledge and enforce their right to own and occupy their ancestral lands. In ruling for the Community, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights recognized that the realization of the right to life is necessarily linked to and dependent on the physical environment. The result was a state obligation to adopt positive measures to fulfill a standard of dignified life.  

Summary by: Sophie Sklar

Link to Original Judgement  

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

This case holds substantial weight in Paraguay and precedential authority in other Inter-American disputes, insofar as it reaffirms the Inter-American Court’s broad interpretation of right to life, which includes consideration of health, environment, education, and food standards.  

Key facts 

The Yakye Axa Indigenous Community had a land claim under consideration since 1993 without resolution. This made it impossible for the Community and its members to own their territory or have adequate access to food and health care.  

Esteban Lopez, leader of the Yakye Axa Community, testified to the Inter-American Court that: 

“Living conditions of the members of the Yakye Axa Community at the place where they currently live are difficult. The settlement is surrounded by cattle ranchers’ land, which they are not allowed to enter. They cannot hunt freely, they have problems finding food and protecting themselves in the country to avoid conflicts with the white persons. The men of the Community cannot feed their children regularly. The witness has to go elsewhere to obtain water and food for the boys and girls. Most members of the Community are jobless.” (¶ 15) 

Previous instances  

On March 3, 1997, the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community filed a suit against firms which had rented the land claimed by the Community, invoking the Paraguayan Constitution, as well as the provisions of Article 14 of Law 234/93 that ratified the International Labor Organization Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. On April 17, 1997, the Civil and Commercial Trial Court, tenth rotation, Secretariat No. 19, dismissed this action on time of filing grounds.1 

In a separate but related proceeding, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights filed before the Inter-American Court an application against the State of Paraguay. The Commission alleged that the State has not ensured the ancestral property rights of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community and its members. The Commission filed the application based on the American Convention on Human Rights, for the Court to decide whether Paraguay breached Articles 4 (Right to Life); 8 (Right to Fair Trial); 21 (Right to Property) and 25 (Judicial Protection) of the Convention with respect to their treatment of the Yakye Axa. The Commission asked the Court to order the State to take certain steps as reparation and to reimburse costs and expenses. 

Summary of holding 

The Court had to establish whether the State generated conditions that worsened the difficulties of the Yakye Axa and, if so, whether it took appropriate positive measures to fulfill its obligations. 

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Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA 

Date: 21 January 2004 

Court: Supreme Court of the United States  

Citation(s): Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) 

Short summary  

Alaska’s Department of Environmental Conservation determined what pollution-restricting technology should be implemented for a mine expansion, per requirements of the Clean Air Act. The federal Environmental Protection Agency intervened, disagreeing with Alaska’s determination of which technology to utilize. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling that the Environmental Protection Agency properly overruled Alaska’s initial determination.  

Summary by: Gazal Gupta 

Link to Original Judgement

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

This decision is binding on all United States federal and state courts.  

Key facts 

Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), state agencies must identify the best strategy to prevent air quality from deteriorating in regions that comply with national air quality standards. In part, they must ensure that polluting industries utilise the “best available control technology” to restrict pollution whenever they construct new facilities. Teck Cominco Alaska, a mining firm, applied for a permit to develop a new generator at one of its mines in 1998. The permit was issued by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), and it required Cominco to use “Low NOx” technology in all its generators, not just the new one. However, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) intervened, claiming that a more advanced technique was available and should be utilized.  

Previous instances  

The EPA’s decision was challenged by ADEC in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the EPA lacked the authority to interfere with the state agency’s decision under the CAA. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favour of the EPA. 

Summary of holding 

On appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to settle whether if the EPA, under the CAA, has the authority to overrule a state agency’s decision that a company is using the “best available controlling technology” to prevent pollution. 

§ 165(a)(4) of the CAA stipulates that no large air pollutant-emitting plant can be built unless it is fitted with the best available control technology. Furthermore, when EPA finds that a state is not complying with a CAA requirement governing the construction of a pollutant source, it has the authority to issue an order prohibiting construction, impose an administrative penalty, or file a civil action for injunctive relief under § 113(a)(5) of the CAA. § 167 of the CAA authorizes EPA to take any necessary action, including issuing an order or pursuing injunctive relief, to prevent the construction of a significant pollutant-emitting plant that does not comply with the CAA’s pollutant criteria. 

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