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Tag: ClimateChange

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UK Government v. Friends of the Earth

Date: 18 July 2022 

Court: High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division Administrative Court 

Citation: [2022] EWHC 1841 (Admin) 

Short summary 

The High Court found that the UK’s net zero strategy is in violation of the Climate Change Act 2008, as it does not meet Government obligations to produce detailed climate policies evidencing how the UK will meet its legally-binding climate budgets.  

Summary by: Olivia Amura

Link to Original Judgement

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision 

This case was decided by the High Court of Justice, the senior court of England and Wales. 

Key facts 

In January 2022, ClientEarth (an environmental law charity) filed a case to the High Court challenging the UK Government (“the Government”) on their inadequate net zero strategy. After the case was granted permission to proceed in March 2022, ClientEarth teamed up with Friends of the Earth (a nonprofit organisation that undertakes campaigns and work for environmental objectives) and the Good Law Project (a nonprofit that relies upon the law for public protection) to prepare a full hearing in the High Court. “The Claimants” (ClientEarth, Friends of the Earth, Good Law Project) argued that (a) the Government had failed to demonstrate that its policies will sufficiently reduce emissions to meet its carbon budgets and (b) the current net zero strategy had failed to include sufficient information about the policies and their effects to a standard to allow proper scrutiny. The Claimants’ arguments, subsequently, lead to the assertion that the Government had breached its obligations under the Climate Change Act 2008 (“CCA”).  

Summary of holding 

The Court asserted that the Minister for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, who signed off the net zero strategy, did not have the legally required information on how carbon budgets would be met when he approved the strategy. The Claimants asserted that ‘the Secretary of State [failed] to comply with his duty […] if his numerical projections show that his proposals and policies would reduce GHG emissions by only a proportion (e.g. 95%) of the reductions required to meet the carbon budgets’ [162]. This led the Court to ultimately deduce that ‘without information on the contributions by individual policies to the 95% assessment, the Minister could not rationally decide for himself how much weight to give to those matters’ [213] and, therefore, be fully informed when signing off the net zero strategy. 

The Court also found that Parliament and the public were not adequately informed about the impact of current emissions cuts from net zero policies and the reductions needed to meet the sixth carbon budget. The Claimants submitted that the net zero strategy report, required under CCA s.14(1), ‘failed to set out the numeric contributions of individual policies and proposals toward reducing GHG’ [226], therefore sufficient scrutiny was not possible. The defendant, by contrast, asserted that whilst the required report must ‘set out’ [226] proposals and policies, it does not demand ‘an explanation or quantified information to show that his proposals and policies will enable the carbon budgets to be met’ [227]. The Court rejected the Defendant’s position, stating that it is ‘the responsibility of the Secretary of State […] to lay a report before Parliament under s.14’ [256] that is ‘legally adequate’ [259], as required under CCA obligations. 

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PSB et al. v. Brazil (on Climate Fund) 

Date: 1 July 2022

Court: The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court

Citation: ADPF 708

Short summary  

Brazil’s Supreme Court became the first in the world to recognize the Paris Agreement as legally equivalent to a human rights treaty which supersedes national law. The Court ordered the Brazilian government to reactivate its Climate Fund, holding that not abiding by its national climate policy constitutes a breach of the Federal Constitution, which requires the State to protect the environment for current and future generations. 

Summary by: Sophie Sklar 

Link to Original Judgement

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Weight of decision  

This case is binding on the government of Brazil and may be influential in other countries.  

Key facts 

This case was first filed in 2020 by four political parties: the Workers’ Party, the Socialism and Liberty Party, the Brazilian Socialist Party and the Sustainability Network. 

The petitioners argued that Brazil’s Climate Fund – created as part of the country’s national climate policy plan – violated the Federal Constitution by not supporting any projects that mitigate climate change. The plaintiffs sought a declaration of “unconstitutional omission” for failing to reactivate the Fund. (While Brazil’s Ministry of the Environment is obligated to prepare an annual plan for the Climate Fund within Brazil, it had not done so since 2019.) 

This case was brought within the context of Brazil’s negligible efforts to combat climate change, both domestically and abroad. The presiding judge cited the high rates of deforestation of the Amazon, and Brazil being the world’s fifth-largest carbon emitter as evidence of the Brazilian climate crisis. 

The federal government made two main arguments in response: 

  • First, that the Court’s interference in this matter would violate the separation of powers doctrine, as this judgement would compel the executive branch to reactivate the Climate Fund via the legislative branch. 
  • Additionally, that, since the Climate Fund was derived from multilateral treaties on climate change and was not Brazilian law, the federal government was not bound by it. 

The petitioners claim that abandoning the Climate Fund violated the Brazilian Federal Constitution, citing the obligation of the Union, the States, the Federal District, and Municipalities to “protect the environment and fight pollution in any of its forms” and “to preserve forests, fauna and flora.” 

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West Virginia v. EPA 

Date: 30 June 2022 

Court: Supreme Court of the United States 

Citation(s): West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 597 U.S. ___ (2022) 

Short summary  

Conservative states and coal companies challenged potential rulemaking by the Environmental Protection Agency which could phase out electricity generation from coal-fired power plants in the United States. In a landmark ruling, the Supreme Court sided with petitioners, holding that the Clean Air Act does not permit such extensive regulations. As a result, it is now significantly more difficult for the federal government to limit carbon emissions absent new legislation from Congress.  

Summary by: David Cremins

Link to Original Judgement

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Weight of decision  

This decision is binding on all United States federal and state courts. 

Key facts 

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has authority to regulate the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases from certain sources under the Clean Air Act (CAA). See Massachusetts v. EPA. Following Massachusetts, typically only the federal government can be sued for failing to adequately limit (or overly limiting) carbon pollution under the CAA, see City of New York v. Chevron; American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, and then usually only by states, not individuals, see Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon.  

Under § 111 of the CAA, EPA can develop a “best system of emissions reduction” to limit their accumulation in the atmosphere. Historically, this authority has been exercised by, for instance, requiring both new and existing power plants to utilize certain technologies to limit carbon emissions. The implementation of these rules is then carried out by the states. See Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA. With the need to quickly decarbonize to combat the climate crisis, however, the EPA has, under Democratic presidential administrations, sought to curtail carbon emissions more aggressively from the U.S. energy sector, especially from coal-fired power plants.  

Previous instances  

In 2015, under the Obama Administration, the EPA proposed the Clean Power Plan (CPP) rule which, in part, encouraged “generation shifting” from coal-fired to natural gas-fired power plants and renewable energy sources via a system of credits and offsets, as part of a cap-and-trade system. In 2016, the Supreme Court blocked implementation of the CPP rule and, under the Trump Administration, the EPA instead proposed the less ambitious Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule, claiming that § 111(d) of the CAA did not allow it to issue industry-wide generation-shifting rules as part of a best system of emissions reduction. Several states sued the EPA for unduly constraining its own authority and the D.C. Circuit agreed, blocking the ACE rule in American Lung Association v. EPA, No. 19-1140 (D.C. Cir. 2021). West Virginia and other states, along with private coal companies, then intervened and brought this case to the Supreme Court, seeking to vacate the D.C. Circuit’s holding and prevent the EPA from ever again promulgating a rule like the CPP. 

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City of New York v. Chevron Corp. 

Date: 2 April 2021 

Court: United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals 

Citation(s): City of N.Y. v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) 

Short summary  

New York City sued the five largest producers of fossil fuels for contributing to climate change under state tort law. The Second Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the suit, holding that state common law claims to redress greenhouse gas emissions are displaced by federal common law, which in turn is displaced by the Clean Air Act.  

Summary by: David Cremins

Link to Original Judgement

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Weight of decision  

This decision is binding on all courts in the Second District and persuasive in other Districts.  

Key facts 

New York City filed a federal lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against the five largest investor-owned fossil fuel producers seeking costs the City had incurred and would continue to incur to protect itself and its residents from the impacts of climate change. The City alleged that the defendants “produced, marketed, and sold massive quantities of fossil fuels” despite knowing for many years that the use of fossil fuels caused emissions of greenhouse gas emissions that would accumulate and remain in the atmosphere for centuries, causing “grave harm.” The City laid alleged state common law tort claims of public and private nuisance and illegal trespass, seeking money damages and an injunction to abate past injuries.  

Previous instances  

The district court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that federal common law should govern the City’s claims because they were based on transboundary emissions. The court further concluded that the Clean Air Act displaced any federal common law claims (see American Electric Power v. Connecticut) with regards to domestic emissions and that foreign emissions should not be regulated by a domestic court, so as not to infringe on the political branches. The City appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals seeking reversal of the granted motion to dismiss.  

Summary of holding  

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of New York City’s lawsuit seeking climate change damages from oil companies, following the reasoning of the district court. First, the Second Circuit held that federal common law displaced the City’s state-law public nuisance, private nuisance, and trespass claims because the lawsuit would regulate cross-border greenhouse gas emissions, albeit “in an indirect and roundabout manner,” and because state law claims “would further risk upsetting the careful balance that has been struck between the prevention of global warming, a project that necessarily requires national standards and global participation, on the one hand, and energy production, economic growth, foreign policy, and national security, on the other.” The Second Circuit then held that the Clean Air Act, in turn, displaced federal common law claims related to domestic emissions. The Second Circuit cited American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), as establishing “beyond cavil” that the Clean Air Act displaced federal common law nuisance suits to abate domestic transboundary greenhouse gas emissions. 

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Ioane Teitiota decision, CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016

Date of judgement: 23 September 2020

Court: United Nations Human Rights Committee

Citation(s): CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016; Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2728/2016

Short summary 

In its first ruling on a complaint by an individual seeking asylum from the effects of climate change, the United Nations Human Rights Committee found that states may not deport individuals who face climate change-induced conditions that violate the right to life.

Summary by: Makaela Fehlhaber

Link to original Judgement 

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Weight of decision 

This decision is significant in that it is one of the first to acknowledge climate change-induced conditions as drivers of asylum claims. The Committee is responsible for holding states to account for upholding the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, however, its decisions are not binding. 

Key facts

The applicant sought asylum (and in the alternative, to be regarded as a protected person) on environmental grounds and argued that this was within the scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 

Further, the applicant contended that deportation back to Kiribati would violate Art. 6 (the right to life) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The applicant sought determination by the Committee on the basis that he had exhausted all available domestic remedies (para. 8.3), a fact not disputed by the State party. 

New Zealand’s primary arguments surrounded the lack of evidence put forth by the applicant to support the argument that there was an imminent risk to his right to life, and that the claim should be deemed inadmissible. 

The Committee was asked to determine whether New Zealand had breached its obligations under the ICCPR by deporting the applicant back to Kiribati on the basis that the evidence did not support a finding that the applicant would face the risk, or would likely face the risk of arbitrary deprivation of life upon his return to Kiribati. 

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Juliana v. United States 

Date: 17 January 2020 

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 

Citation(s): Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020)

Short summary  

A group of young people sued the United States government for failing to prevent climate change, seeking an order requiring the government to develop a plan to phase out domestic fossil fuel emissions. The plaintiffs claimed violations of their substantive due process, equal protection, the Ninth Amendment, and the public trust doctrine. The court found that the plaintiffs established injury-in-fact and causation for Article III standing but that their claim failed for lack of redressability. 

Summary by: Nicole Gasmen and Luke Hancox

Link to Original Judgement

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Weight of decision  

This decision comes from the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals and is therefore binding on all courts in the Circuit and persuasive in other federal courts.   

Key facts 

The plaintiffs were twenty-one young citizens, an environmental organization, and a “representative of future generations.” [1165] They sued the President (later dismissed from the action), the United States, and federal agencies. The complaint accused the government of continuing to “permit, authorize, and subsidize” [1165] fossil fuel use, despite awareness of its risks, leading to various climate-change-related injuries. The plaintiffs’ claims varied from psychological harm and impairment of recreational interests to exacerbated medical conditions and property damage. 

The complaint asserted violations of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights: 

“(1) the plaintiffs’ substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) the plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth Amendment to equal protection of the law; (3) the plaintiffs’ rights under the Ninth Amendment; and (4) the public trust doctrine.” [1165] 

The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction ordering the government to implement a plan to “phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric [carbon dioxide].” [1165] 

The court noted that the District Court record and this appeal recognized climate change is occurring at a rapid pace. The court stated that rising carbon emissions would wreak havoc on the Earth’s climate if left unchecked, and that the federal government long understood these risks and affirmatively contributed to their worsening. 

The government largely did not contest the factual basis for the plaintiffs’ claims, only that they lacked standing to pursue them. 

Previous instances  

The District Court denied the government’s motion to dismiss. That court stated that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue their claims that the government violated their constitutional rights, including a Fifth Amendment right to a “climate system capable of sustaining human life.” [1165] The District Court also found a separate viable “danger-creation due process claim” [1165] based on the government’s lack of regulation on third-party emissions and a public trust doctrine claim. 

At summary judgment, the District Court dismissed the President as a defendant and dismissed the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim in part. That court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ Ninth Amendment claims. The government then sought this interlocutory appeal to resolve the standing issue and other grounds for dismissal. 

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Urgenda Foundation v. the State of the Netherlands 

Date: 20 December 2019 

Court: Supreme Court of the Netherlands 

Citation(s): ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007 

Short summary  

The Supreme Court of the Netherlands held that the Dutch State was obliged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 25% by the end of 2020, compared to 1990 levels. This obligation stemmed from the Netherlands’ commitments under the European Convention on Human Rights, including Dutch citizens’ rights to life and respect for private and family life. 

Summary by: Clarrisa Burki

Link to Original Judgement

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Weight of decision  

The judgment was handed down by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, the highest judicial body within that nation. It is binding within the Netherlands and compels the government to act. 

Key facts 

The Urgenda Foundation (“Urgenda”), a Dutch environmental group, brought an action to require the Dutch government to take measures to combat climate change. Urgenda based their action on the right to life and the right to a healthy environment. The European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) requires the State to protect these rights for their residents. Article 2 guarantees the right to life and Article 8 ensures the right to respect for private and family life. The European Court of Human Rights has held that the ECHR places an obligation on a State to act and take the appropriate measures when there is a real and immediate risk to people’s lives or welfare and when the State is aware of this. This obligation equally applies when it comes to wide-reaching environmental risks threatening large groups or the population as a whole even if these threats will only materialise over the long term. 

According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), each country is responsible for its own share of emissions; each state is therefore obliged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in proportion to its share of the responsibility. 

In this case, the State asserted that it is not for the courts to undertake the considerations required for a decision on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and that doing so would amount to an order to create legislation, violating the separation of powers. 

Previous instances  

In the District Court, Urgenda sought a court order to order the Netherlands to reduce its emission of greenhouse gasses such that, by the end of 2020, emissions would be reduced by 40% compared to 1990 levels. The District Court upheld the plaintiff’s claim in part and ordered the State to reduce emissions by at least 25% compared to 1990 by 2020.  

The District Court’s order was upheld by the Court of Appeal. 

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AV (Nepal) [2017] NZIPT 801125, 26 

Date: 22 September 2017 

Court: New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal 

Citation(s): [2017] NZIPT 801125, 26 

Short summary 

Appellants, suffering from PTSD, claimed that they could not return to Nepal due to fear induced by the deadly 2015 earthquake. The Tribunal denied them leave to remain as they had not suffered from persecution resulting from actions of the State and did not meet the definition of a refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention.  

Summary by: Lucas Robinson  

Link to Original Judgement

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Weight of decision 

The New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal (NZPT) is an independent judicial body that was established under § 127 of the Immigration Act 2009. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear appeals against immigration and refugee decisions made by State bodies. As appealing to the High Court can only be made on a point of law, the NZPT decisions carry substantial weight in domestic law. 

Key facts 

Appellants, a married Nepalese couple, appealed the decision made by a refugee and protection officer that they were not to be granted refugee status in New Zealand. They argued that following the April 2015 earthquake in Nepal, they had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and feared the prospect of returning to Kathmandu. The earthquake rendered their home unhabitable and for a period of time they slept in tents. However, although they partly repaired their home, evidence was offered that they often slept on the veranda due to the fear of aftershocks. Appellants argued that they both felt much safer residing in New Zealand where their son and his family had been granted residence status and had purchased a home. Additionally, the Appellants’ General Practitioner gave evidence indicating that the wife did in fact suffer from PTSD and that both of the Appellants suffered from physical injury on account of the earthquake, which had left them in chronic pain for some time.  

Summary of holding 

The Tribunal determined that the relevant tests were set out in the Immigration Act 2009 under § 194(1)(c). Namely, it must be found that appellants are refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention, protected persons under the 1984 Convention Against Torture, or protected persons under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to receive asylum.  

In regard to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it was necessary for the Appellants to show, as per Article 1A(2), that “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted,” they were unable to return to Nepal on account of their “race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social or political group”.  The Tribunal followed the view in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, that “being persecuted” required serious harm arising from the sustained or systemic violation of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection. Additionally, a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there isa real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring (Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379). The Appellants acknowledged that they did not fear the Nepalese state itself, but rather the fear of future earthquakes and the prospect of returning to Kathmandu without the support of their children. In light of this, the Tribunal cited AF (Kribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, a case that set out whilst natural disasters could involve human rights issues, the definition set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention still had to be satisfied.  

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Beauboeuf v. Canada

Date: 21 October 2016 

Court: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Immigration Appeal Division) 

Citation(s): 2016 CarswellNat 8691  

Short summary  

A 71-year-old Haitian applicant successfully appealed a refusal letter denying her permanent residency in Canada. While she was originally denied a visa because of the potential for her health conditions to cause excessive demand on health or social services in Canada, she demonstrated compelling humanitarian and compassionate grounds that warranted special relief. A major element of her humanitarian and compassionate claim was the devastation ensuing from the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. 

Summary by: Erin Levitsky 

Link to original judgement  

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

This decision is not binding on Canadian courts because it comes from a tribunal. It is persuasive, however, and the fact that it is an appeal decision gives it greater weight. 

Key facts 

The appellant, Yamiley Beauboeuf, and her husband were both born in Haiti and are both citizens of Canada. They have two sons who are also Canadian. The family lives in Ottawa.  

Following the devastating earthquake in Haiti in 2010, Beauboeuf’s mother, Rose Marie Yolaine Napoléon came to visit her family in Canada and never left. Beauboeuf and her husband co-sponsored Napoléon for permanent residence (PR) as a member of the family.

Previous instances 

In October 2012, Napoléon received a procedural fairness letter containing the opinion of a medical officer who determined that her medical condition—diabetic illness complicated by chronic kidney disease—might cause excessive demand on health or social services in Canada. Napoléon provided additional submissions and documents but Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) ultimately issued a refusal letter in April 13 refusing her PR citing the same concern, pursuant to § 38(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). Beauboeuf appealed the decision. 

Summary of holding 

Rather than contest the legal validity of the refusal letter, the appellant argued there were “sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations, taking into account the best interests of the children directly affected by the decision and the other relevant circumstances of her case” (¶ 3) to justify special relief pursuant to ¶ 67(1)(c) of the IRPA. The Minister argued the threshold for relief based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds was not met. 

The Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) allowed the appeal, holding that while the refusal letter was legally valid, the humanitarian and compassionate considerations put forward were sufficient to warrant special relief. 

The IAD considered several factors to determine whether humanitarian and compassionate considerations were sufficient, including: 

“(i) the relationship of the sponsor to the applicant and the strength of that relationship; (ii) the reasons for the sponsorship; (iii) the overall situation of both the sponsor and the applicant; (iv) the family support in Canada; (v) the existence of dependency as between the applicant and the sponsor; (vi) the best interests of any children directly affected by the decision; and (vii) the objectives of the IRPA” (¶ 5). 

The IAD considered the fact that the main reason Beauboeuf sponsored her mother was to keep her alive. It held that being deported would be akin to a death sentence, as dialysis, the medical treatment she required, was not available in Haiti.  

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AF (Tuvalu) [2015] NZIPT 800859

Date: 20 October 2015

Court: New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal

Citation: [2015] NZIPT 800859

Short summary

This case was heard before the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal. It is an appeal against the decision taken by a refugee and protection officer to deny refugee status or protected person status to the appellant, a 25-year-old man of Tuvaluan nationality who had been served with a deportation order. The appellant based his appeal on the claim that he had a real chance of being persecuted if returned to his country of nationality in relation to an infringement of his right to work and of his right to safe drinking water. The appellant also claimed that his deportation to Tuvalu would be a violation of his daughters’ rights under the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant could reasonably access clean drinking water and reasonably attempt to gain employment in Tuvalu.

Summary by: Lucas Robinson

Link to original judgement

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Weight of decision

The New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal is an independent judicial body and has jurisdiction to hear appeals against deportations, refugee claims, and other immigration decisions. A decision from the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal can be reviewed by the High Court only if an appeal is made on a point of law. In that sense, the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal’s decisions carry substantial weight in New Zealand domestic law.

Key facts

The appellant was a citizen of Tuvalu, who was 25 years old at the time of the hearing. In 2003, he moved to New Zealand with his mother. This event forced him to drop out of school in Tuvalu. He has been living in New Zealand since then and never went back to school.  In 2008, he married a New Zealand citizen and they had two daughters together. Between 2008 and 2014, the appellant was convicted of multiple offences/crimes in New Zealand. As a result, in July 2014, the appellant was served with a deportation order. In December 2014, the appellant submitted a claim to be recognised as a refugee or as a protected person. A refugee and protection officer denied his claim. This case is the appeal against the aforementioned refusal.

The appellant appealed the decision on three grounds. First, the appellant fears returning to Tuvalu because of the lack of employment opportunities. Indeed, he fears that the government of Tuvalu will discriminate against him due to his criminal convictions and lack of formal education, therefore violating his right to work. Second, the appellant claims that, if returned to his country of nationality, he would not be able to exercise his right to access safe drinking water due to the effects of climate change. Third, the appellant claims that his deportation to Tuvalu would violate his daughters’ rights under the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Previous instances

In July 2014, the appellant was served with a deportation order as a result of his convictions for crimes he committed between 2008 and 2014. His attempt to get this deportation order revoked was unsuccessful. Facing deportation, the appellant submitted an application to be recognised as a refugee or protected person. A refugee and protection officer declined to grant the appellant’s application.

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