Earth Refuge Legal

June 15, 2005October 7, 2022

Weight of decision

This case holds substantial weight in Paraguay and precedential authority in other Inter-American disputes, insofar as it reaffirms the Inter-American Court’s broad interpretation of right to life, which includes consideration of health, environment, education, and food standards.

Key facts

The Yakye Axa Indigenous Community had a land claim under consideration since 1993 without resolution. This made it impossible for the Community and its members to own their territory or have adequate access to food and health care.

Esteban Lopez, leader of the Yakye Axa Community, testified to the Inter-American Court that:

“Living conditions of the members of the Yakye Axa Community at the place where they currently live are difficult. The settlement is surrounded by cattle ranchers’ land, which they are not allowed to enter. They cannot hunt freely, they have problems finding food and protecting themselves in the country to avoid conflicts with the white persons. The men of the Community cannot feed their children regularly. The witness has to go elsewhere to obtain water and food for the boys and girls. Most members of the Community are jobless.” (¶ 15)

Previous instances

On March 3, 1997, the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community filed a suit against firms which had rented the land claimed by the Community, invoking the Paraguayan Constitution, as well as the provisions of Article 14 of Law 234/93 that ratified the International Labor Organization Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. On April 17, 1997, the Civil and Commercial Trial Court, tenth rotation, Secretariat No. 19, dismissed this action on time of filing grounds.¹

In a separate but related proceeding, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights filed before the Inter-American Court an application against the State of Paraguay. The Commission alleged that the State has not ensured the ancestral property rights of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community and its members. The Commission filed the application based on the American Convention on Human Rights, for the Court to decide whether Paraguay breached Articles 4 (Right to Life); 8 (Right to Fair Trial); 21 (Right to Property) and 25 (Judicial Protection) of the Convention with respect to their treatment of the Yakye Axa. The Commission asked the Court to order the State to take certain steps as reparation and to reimburse costs and expenses.

Summary of holding

The Court had to establish whether the State generated conditions that worsened the difficulties of the Yakye Axa and, if so, whether it took appropriate positive measures to fulfill its obligations.

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Moiwana Community v. Suriname

Date: 15 June 2005

Court: Inter-American Court of Human Rights

Citation: IACtHR, Moiwana Village v. Suriname, Judgment, 15 June 2005, Series C, No.145 (2005)

Short summary

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)held that the State of Suriname violated the Moiwana’s right to property by its failure to conduct an effective investigation into the events which caused the internal displacement of the Moiwana community. The Court stressed the profound ties of the Moiwana community to their traditional lands which were integral to their identity and existence.

Summary by: Wong Ho Yin

March 3, 2005October 17, 2022

Weight of decision

The IACtHR applies the American Convention on Human Rights and States that have recognised the jurisdiction of the IACtHR are bound by its judgments. As this case originated in an application against Suriname, a then State who recognised the jurisdiction of the IACtHR, the judgment is binding and Suriname must implement its recommendations.

Key facts

The N’djuka maroon village of Moiwana faced attacks and massacre by members of the armed forces of Suriname in 1986. Inhabitants of Moiwana were forcibly displaced within Suriname and they were unable to maintain their means of livelihood and subsistence. There was not sufficient investigation of the massacre, not to mention prosecution or punishment of the perpetrators.

Previous instances

In 1997, the human rights organization Moiwana ‘86 filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with respect of Articles 25 (right to judicial protection), 8 (right to a fair trial) and 1(1) (obligation to respect rights) of the American Convention against the State of Suriname. The Inter-American Commission found the petition admissible and made recommendations to Suriname to take actions to address the massacre. After unsuccessful attempts to facilitate compliance with its recommendations, the Inter-American Commission referred the case to the Inter-American Court.

Summary of holding

The Court decided that Suriname’s failure to investigate the events has directly prevented the Moiwana community from resuming their lives in the traditional lands which were their ancestral territory.

The Court held that even when the Moiwana community did not own formal legal title to the territory (as the land belonged to the State), they obtained “official recognition of their communal ownership” of the land by mere occupation of the land pursuant to customary practices. The Court took into account the “unique and enduring ties that bind indigenous communities to their ancestral territory”.(para. 131). The Court opined that:

“The relationship of an indigenous community with its land must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of its culture, spiritual life, integrity, and economic survival. For such peoples, their communal nexus with the ancestral territory is not merely a matter of possession and production, but rather consists in material and spiritual elements that must be fully integrated and enjoyed by the community, so that it may preserve its cultural legacy and pass it on to future generations.” (emphasis added) (see para. 131)

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Taskin and Ors. v. Turkey (2006) 42 EHRR 50

Date of judgement: 3 March 2005

Court: European Court of Human Rights

Citation(s): Application no. 46117/99, (2006) 42 EHRR 50

Short summary

The European Court of Human Rights held that environmental pollution could affect Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to private and family life). The Turkish Government had violated Art. 8, even if such pollution did not have serious health-related consequences.

Summary by: Makaela Fehlhaber

Link to original Judgement

January 21, 2004July 4, 2022

Weight of decision

Given the jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights, the Taskin judgement is significant and bears considerable weight.

Key facts

The applicants were residents of Bergama. In 1992, the respondent had granted permits to operate a gold mine in Ovacik, a district within Bergama. The applicants contended that as a result of the granting of these permits, they had suffered and continued to suffer the effects of environmental damage – namely the inability to move freely and noise pollution – from the use of machinery and explosives.

Previous instances

Subsequently, the applicants sought judicial review in the Administrative Court of the Ministry of Environment’s of the decision to issue the permits on the grounds of the risks posed to human health and safety. The application was dismissed by the Court in 1996, but the provincial governor of the area agreed to suspend mining operations for one month in the subsequent year in the interests of the public.

In 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court overturned the Administrative Court’s decision, finding that the mining activities did not serve the public interests towards health and safety measures. This was later upheld by the Administrative Court. However, irrespective of these decisions and subsequent orders, the mine reopened in an experimental capacity in 2001.

Ten Turkish nationals lodged an application (no. 46117/99) against the Republic of Turkey to the European Commission of Human Rights in 1998 under Art. 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention). The applicants contended that the actions of the respondent violated Art. 2 (right to life) and Art. 8 (right to private and family life) of the Convention. Under Art. 8, the applicants alleged that the use of cyanidation operating processes violated their right to private and family life as its uses posed a significant risk (para. 104). The applicants further stated that their judicial rights had not been upheld in accordance with Art. 6 (right to a fair trial) and Art. 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the Convention. Accordingly, they sought compensation for infringement of these rights, and for failure to enforce a judgement.

The respondents contended that the arguments submitted in respect of Art. 8 were based on hypothetical risks that may or may not materialise. Accordingly, this could not be categorised as a serious and imminent risk (para. 107) as there needed to be a direct effect (para. 108) upon the lives of the applicants. Furthermore, the respondents submitted that Art. 8 was inapplicable as it had previously been determined that the risks of mining did not present any danger for the health of the local population (para. 9), as the government had conducted an Environmental Impact Assessment. The respondent further submitted that Art. 6 of the Convention did not apply for the same reasons (para. 128).

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Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA

Date: 21 January 2004

Court: Supreme Court of the United States

Citation(s): Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004)

Short summary

Alaska’s Department of Environmental Conservation determined what pollution-restricting technology should be implemented for a mine expansion, per requirements of the Clean Air Act. The federal Environmental Protection Agency intervened, disagreeing with Alaska’s determination of which technology to utilize. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling that the Environmental Protection Agency properly overruled Alaska’s initial determination.

Summary by: Gazal Gupta

August 13, 2002May 7, 2023

Weight of decision

This decision is binding on all United States federal and state courts.

Key facts

Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), state agencies must identify the best strategy to prevent air quality from deteriorating in regions that comply with national air quality standards. In part, they must ensure that polluting industries utilise the “best available control technology” to restrict pollution whenever they construct new facilities. Teck Cominco Alaska, a mining firm, applied for a permit to develop a new generator at one of its mines in 1998. The permit was issued by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), and it required Cominco to use “Low NOx” technology in all its generators, not just the new one. However, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) intervened, claiming that a more advanced technique was available and should be utilized.

Previous instances

The EPA’s decision was challenged by ADEC in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the EPA lacked the authority to interfere with the state agency’s decision under the CAA. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favour of the EPA.

Summary of holding

On appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to settle whether if the EPA, under the CAA, has the authority to overrule a state agency’s decision that a company is using the “best available controlling technology” to prevent pollution.

§ 165(a)(4) of the CAA stipulates that no large air pollutant-emitting plant can be built unless it is fitted with the best available control technology. Furthermore, when EPA finds that a state is not complying with a CAA requirement governing the construction of a pollutant source, it has the authority to issue an order prohibiting construction, impose an administrative penalty, or file a civil action for injunctive relief under § 113(a)(5) of the CAA. § 167 of the CAA authorizes EPA to take any necessary action, including issuing an order or pursuing injunctive relief, to prevent the construction of a significant pollutant-emitting plant that does not comply with the CAA’s pollutant criteria.

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Ontunez Tursios v. Ashcroft

Date: 13 August 2002

Court: United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

Citation: 303 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2002)

Short summary

A Honduran man, fleeing targeted violence stemming from a land dispute and exacerbated by hurricane damage, was denied refugee status in the United States for failing to establish a nexus between his persecution and the grounds for asylum.

Summary by: David Cremins

May 16, 2002August 27, 2023

Weight of decision

This decision is a binding part of the asylum case law developed in the Fifth Circuit (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) and may be persuasive in other jurisdictions in the United States.

Key facts

The applicant for asylum, Mr. Ontunez-Tursios, moved to the town of La Ceiba in 1994 and joined other campesinos in cultivating a piece of coastal land known as Las Delicias. In 1996, a group of businessmen, wishing to sell Las Delicias to Korean investors, challenged the campesinos possession of the land, unleashing a campaign of violence and intimidation against them, during which at least two campesinos were assassinated. Mr. Ontunez-Tursios found out he was on a hit list and, after being directly threatened several times, fled to the United States, where he applied for asylum in October 1999.

During this violent dispute over land possession, in October 1998 Hurricane Mitch devastated Honduras, including Las Delicias. The storm ruined Mr. Ontunez-Tursios’ land as well as key documentary evidence against the businessmen pursuing him and the other campesinos.

Previous instances

The immigration judge who first heard Mr. Ontunez-Tursios’ case denied him refugee status because his claim did not arise on account of the enumerated grounds for persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed that he failed to show a nexus between his persecution and either his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, leading to this appeal before the Fifth Circuit.

Summary of holding

In a 2-1 panel decision, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the rulings below, finding that the BIA correctly dismissed Mr. Ontunez-Tursios’ contention that his leadership in the land conflict did not constitute a political opinion or membership in the particular social group of “land rights leaders”. Stripping away the context of land struggle and the impacts of Hurricane Mitch, the court held that his “evidence showed no motive of the persecutors other than a private, economic one.” The court further found that Mr. Ontunez-Tursios did not qualify for withholding of removal because he was at no risk of torture in his home country, and that the Honduran government had not implicitly or explicitly acquiesced to his persecution or torture.

Potential takeaways for future climate migration litigation

Increasingly, claims for asylum and other humanitarian protections will have to be considered in the context of climate change. The devastation wrought by Hurricane Mitch in Honduras provides an early example of how an already difficult situation – a violent battle over valuable land between the upper and lower classes in a society – is made worse following disasters. Advocates for climate migrants should note how fights over land and other forms of social violence intermix with a changing climate, including through slow-onset shifts in conditions.

As in other cases in jurisdictions around the world, the harm from the climate disaster itself – destruction of land and evidentiary documents – had no bearing on Mr. Ontunez-Tursios’ unsuccessful claim for asylum, even as it exacerbated his vulnerability in his home country.

Under United States law, the nexus prong – that persecution must be “on account of” one of the five grounds first laid out in the 1951 Refugee Convention – is often narrowly construed, such that even clear instances of persecutory violence, whether or not connected to climate change, do not qualify even sympathetic applicants such as Mr. Ontunez-Tursios for refugee status.

Montenegro v. Ashcroft

Date: 16 May 2002

Court: United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

Citation: 68 Fed. Appx. 290

Short summary

A Guatemalan man petitioned for asylum in the United States after suffering persecution attributed to his labour union activity. An immigration judge found his testimony credible and granted the man and his family asylum, a decision ultimately upheld by a federal appeals court.

Summary by: Elisa D’Amico

August 23, 2001February 14, 2022

Weight of decision

This decision is a binding part of the asylum case law developed in the Third Circuit (Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania). Courts outside of the Third Circuit – including immigration and other federal courts – may find the case’s reasoning persuasive when evaluating similar asylum claims.

Key facts

Werner Montenegro, born in Guatemala on in 1951 and began working as an agricultural internal auditor for a semi-public wheat growers association in 1982. During this period, Montenegro and others organized a labor union, which faced opposition from management led by Carlos Pac. He claimed to have faced assaults and threats in Guatemala due to his involvement in labor union activities, driven by economic scarcity in his sector.

Previous instances

Immigration Judge Alberto Riefkohl found Montenegro’s testimony credible and granted him, along with his wife and son, asylum, recognizing their need for protection from “a group that the government is unwilling or unable to control.” However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) overturned the Judge’s decision, contending that the harm the family suffered did not meet the threshold for persecution.

Summary of holding

On Montenegro’s appeal of the BIA decision, a panel of judges on the Third Circuit conducted a thorough examination of Montenegro’s testimony and supporting evidence. Based on evidence of past persecution linked to Montenegro’s labor union involvement, the court concluded that his claim was well-founded and merited protection under asylum laws. The case was remanded back to the Immigration Judge, directing him to grant asylum to Montenegro and his family.

The Third Circuit found that the BIA’s decision lacked proper support from the record, and its characterization of the evidence as “vague” was unjustified. For example, the court highlighted the attack on Mrs. Montenegro, Werner’s wife, which involved threats and physical violence in the presence of their young daughter. The court found this incident to be especially concerning and constituting persecution under the law.

Furthermore, the court explained that once an applicant demonstrates past persecution, as Werner Montenegro did, there is a presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution. The BIA failed to rebut this presumption with evidence showing a fundamental change in circumstances or the possibility of avoiding persecution through relocation. Thus, Montenegro’s eligibility for asylum was firmly established.

Therefore, the court vacated the BIA’s order and remanded the case for the Immigration Judge to grant the application for asylum. The court’s decision ensured that the Montenegro family received the protection they sought, recognizing the persecution they endured in their home country related to Montenegro’s sectoral efforts.

Potential takeaways for future climate migration litigation

Montenegro v. Ashcroft may set precedent for asylum claims based on climate-induced poverty and violence. It recognizes the link between economic migration and persecution, allowing individuals to be granted asylum based on sector- or work-related persecution. This case highlights the significance of considering economic aspects in asylum cases, especially in regions facing resource scarcity and escalating tensions attributable to climate change.

As climate change worsens, placing increased pressure on the agricultural sector, this case may gain greater significance for individuals seeking asylum based on persecution associated with their sectoral involvement. By recognizing the impending stress on agricultural sector workers, the case sets a vital standard for courts to consider when evaluating the challenges faced by those displaced within this sector. For example, agricultural workers may confront heightened violence and persecution as a result of escalating resource competition driven by climate change. Challenges also extend to women engaged in informal agricultural work, who find themselves uniquely susceptible to exploitation and harassment amid climate-related internal displacement. Moreover, as climate change renders certain work and livelihoods unmaintainable, climate-afflicted migrants often find themselves moving as economic migrants, seeking alternative opportunities due to the adverse effects of climate change on their traditional occupations.

Advocates should also take note of how small-scale and Indigenous farmers face heightened persecution in the context of climate change, leveraging this and similar cases to advocate for more comprehensive asylum frameworks which recognize the nuanced ways environmental degradation, economic precarity, and pre-existing social vulnerabilities contribute to persecution.

Hagi-Mohamed v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1156

Date of judgement: 23 August 2001

Court: Federal Court of Australia

Citation(s): [2001] FCA 1156

Short summary

The Federal Court of Australia confirmed that internal relocation must be considered separately from the question of whether a well-founded fear of persecution exists in evaluating claims for protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Summary by: Joseph Lavelle Wilson

July 31, 1995February 14, 2022

Weight of decision

This decision of the Federal Court bears moderate weight in the Commonwealth of Australia.

Key facts

Ahmed Dahir Hagi-Mohamed, a citizen of Somalia, arrived in Australia on 15 September 1995. He filed an application for a protection visa under s. 36 of the Australian Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in November 1995, claiming that the Australian government had an obligation to protect him under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (the Convention). The basis of his application was that he had a well-founded fear of persecution in his home country of Somalia, due to his membership of several social groups.

Hagi-Mohamed claimed that he was a member of the particular social group (that of homosexual men), as well as a member of two clans – the Geledi clan and the Hawadle clan.

Previous instances

The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs and the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) rejected the application for protection. The RRT accepted that each group identified by Hagi-Mohamed was in fact a particular social group, and that he belonged to each one. The RRT found that the motivating reason for the persecution of Geledi clan members by Somalian militias was to take resources from the Geledi clan, specifically arable land and crops, rather than for the reason that they were members of the Geledi clan. The RRT also found that Hagi-Mohamed’s association with his mother’s clan, the Hawadle, did not put him at risk of persecution because there was evidence that other parts of Somalia were controlled by the Hawadle and he could be safe there. With respect to Hagi-Mohamed’s claim based on his homosexuality, the RRT found that although he did belong to the cognisable social group, that group did not face danger rising to the level of persecution under the Convention.

Hagi-Mohamed appealed to the Federal Court of Australia. Justice Stone issued a decision in favour of the government, which was subsequently appealed by Hagi-Mohamed and heard by Justices Wilcox, Weinberg, and Hely in the Federal Court of Australia.

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Simunek, Hastings, Tuzilova and Prochazka v. The Czech Republic, Communication No. 516/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/54/D/516/1992 (1995)

Date of judgement: 31 July 1995

Court: United Nations Human Rights Committee

Citation(s): Communication No. 516/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/54/D/516/1992 (1995)

Short summary

This decision of the United Nations Human Rights Committee Violation of Article 26 ICCPR; OHCHR decision on Czech law requiring citizenship as a necessary condition for restitution of confiscated property.

Summary by: Yusuf Lahham

July 1, 1982November 23, 2022

Weight of decision

This case concerns the Czech Republic, a signatory of the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, thus the ruling is legally binding in the sphere of International Law.

Key facts

The applicants, Alina Simunek (a Polish citizen) and Jaroslav Simunek (a Czech citizen), were forced to leave former Czechoslovakia in 1987 due to the actions of the security forces of the Communist regime.

In 1990, following the fall of the Communist government, both applicants returned to the country in order to reacquire their property through the regulations that had been put in place for returning Czech citizens. However, the applicants were informed that between 1989 and 1990, their property had been auctioned and sold by the District National Committee (DNC) of Jablonece. Whilst some items had been destroyed, the real estate was transferred to Mr Simunek’s employer, the Sklarny factory in Jablonece.

Previous instances

An arbitration hearing was arranged between the applicants and representatives of the factory after a complaint was lodged against the DNC. However, the latter’s representatives argued that the transfer of real estate had not been conducted illegally. The applicants then requested an investigation by the district public prosecutor on the grounds that the transfer of property had taken place without court proceedings or a court order. An investigation was launched, and a report was produced in November 1990. It asserted that there had been no violation of the relevant regulations and that the applicants’ claims should be dismissed.

In February 1991, the regulations were amended by Act 87/1991, which set out the conditions for returning Czech citizens to be entitled to restitution. Section 3(1) of the Act stated that those with State-seized property were only entitled to restitution if they were both citizens of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, and permanent residents in its territory. Other sections of the Act set out that where a property is illegally possessed and the claimant requests restitution, the burden of proof would be with the applicant to show that there was a valid claim to the property, and to prove how the property was turned over to the State.

The Act stipulated that a request for restitution had to be submitted within 6 months of the entry into force of the Act, and failure to do so meant that the claim could be submitted to a tribunal within one year of the date of entry into force of the Act.

The applicants had not submitted a claim for restitution to the local courts as required by the Act, because due to Alina Simunek’s Polish citizenship, they did not fulfil the citizenship and residency requirements set out in Section 3(1).

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Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex. rel., Barez

Date: 1 July 1982

Court: Supreme Court of the United States

Citation: 458 U.S. 592

Short summary

The United States Supreme Court held that a State can establish standing to bring suit under the doctrine of parens patriae when its quasi-sovereign interests have been injured. Quasi-sovereign interests include those interests that the State has in the health and well-being – both physical and economic – of its citizens. When Virginia farmers discriminated against Puerto Rican farmworkers in violation of federal statute, Puerto Rico alleged an injury sufficient to establish parens patriae standing.

Summary by: Sara Sam-Njogu

Link to original judgment

April 16, 1938February 14, 2022

Weight of decision

Given the jurisdiction of the US Supreme Court, this decision is significant for States, and potentially other countries, that wish to establish standing when a large segment of their population has been physically and/or economically harmed.

Key facts

Respondent was the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which sued several apple farmers in the state of Virginia. Puerto Rico contended that despite a substantial advertised need for temporary farm laborers to pick the large 1978 apple crop, its farmworkers had been improperly refused employment based upon their Puerto Rican citizenship, illegal discrimination under several federal laws. Many of the workers were advised by the US Department of Labor not to travel to Virginia because growers were refusing to employ the workers who had already arrived, and those who had been employed were dismissed quickly for alleged unproductivity. The growers were hiring foreign workers instead. Puerto Rico sought to establish parens patriae standing because this discrimination invaded the Commonwealth’s interest in its citizens’ full and equal participation in the federal employment service scheme under the relevant federal laws.

Previous instances

In 1979, Puerto Rico filed suit in United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia (469 F.Supp. 928). While the court found that Puerto Rico may be capable of asserting parens patriae interests for some cases, it held that the relatively small number of farmworkers refused employment in this case – approximately 787 – meant that the injury was too small to Puerto Rico’s economy overall to establish standing.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the District Court’s interpretation of the issue was too narrow (632 F.2d. 365). Instead, the proper focus was the “deliberate efforts to stigmatize the labor force as inferior,” conduct that would have an indirect effect on a substantial portion of Puerto Rico’s citizenry. It found the injury sufficient to establish parens patriae standing.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, leading to the current holding.

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THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION CASE (UNITED STATES VS CANADA)

Date of judgement: 16 April 1938 and 11 March 1941

Citation(s): UN REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS, Trail Smelter case (USA v. Canada), 16. April 1938 and 11. March 1941, Volume III pp. 1905-1982

Short summary

This arbitration case between the United States (U.S.) and Canada is the foundational decision for the development of the prohibition of significant transboundary environmental damage in international environmental law.

Summary by: Robert Los