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 I.L. v. Italian Ministry of the Interior and Attorney General at the Court of Appeal of Ancona 

Date: 24 February 2021 

Court: The Supreme Court of Cassation – Second Civil Section 

Citation: Ordinance N. 5022/2021 of the Italian Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Sez. II Civile) 

Short summary  

This case established that Italian trial judges should collectively assess situations of environmental, social or climate degradation in humanitarian asylum cases, including whether natural resources are subject to unsustainable exploitation in the country of origin of the individual seeking refuge. The specific matter was remanded to a lower court.  

Summary by: Mackenzie Stern 

Link to Original Judgement

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

As the highest court in Italy, this decision from the Court of Cassation is binding throughout Italy. It therefore sets out a test for all Italian trial judges to conduct in humanitarian protection cases which includes environmental, social, and climate degradation in addition to instances of armed conflict.  

Key facts 

IL, a citizen of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria left his home and sought international humanitarian protection in Italy. He fled in part due to armed paramilitary conflict in the region, which was exacerbated by environmental destruction, including numerous oil spills.  

Previous instances  

IL’s application for asylum was initially rejected by the Territorial Commission for the Recognition of International Protection, prompting an appeal to the Court of Ancona. Following a second rejection, IL appealed to the Court of Cassation, Italy’s highest appellate body.   

IL grounded his appeals on two theories. First, the courts below committed prejudicial error by failing to consider altogether the environmental disaster situation in the Niger Delta. Second, the trial judge violated the Consolidated Immigration Act (Legislative Decree) No. 286/1998 by not extending humanitarian protection based on this environmental disaster.  

Summary of holding 

The Court accepted IL’s appeal and referred the case back to the Court of Ancona. 

The Court determined that IL’s two grounds for appeal were well-founded. The Court acknowledged the existence of serious environmental instability in the Niger Delta, due to indiscriminate exploitation of the area by oil companies and ethnic-political conflicts. The Court found that the trial judge did not consider the context of environmental instability and widespread insecurity when considering eligibility for humanitarian protection.  

The Court held that: 

“It follows from the foregoing that if, as in the present case, the trial judge finds, in a specific area, a situation suitable for integrating an environmental disaster, or in any case a context of serious compromise of natural resources which is accompanied by the exclusion of entire segments of the population from their enjoyment, the assessment of the widespread dangerous condition existing in the applicant’s country of origin, for the purpose of recognizing humanitarian protection, must be conducted with specific reference to the particular risk for the right to life and dignified existence deriving environmental degradation, climate change or unsustainable development of the area.” (¶ 6) 

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 CAA de Bordeaux, 2ème chambre, 20BX02193, 20BX02195

Date: 18 December 2020

Court: Court of Administrative Appeal of Bordeaux 

Citations: N° 20BX02193, 20BX02195

Short summary  

In this judgement, the Court overturned the deportation order issued by the French department, Prefect of Haute-Garonne (“Prefect”), against Mr. Sheel on the grounds that it would subject him to a real risk of harm and even death given the high levels of air pollution in Bangladesh and the lack of access to adequate health care services, medication, and respiratory assistance equipment. 

Summary by: Jodie Tang 

Link to Original Judgement

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

Though an individual judgment, this decision holds immense weight in France because it was the first time the courts extended protection to someone fearful of returning home due to environmental conditions.  

Key facts 

Mr. Sheel, a name given to him by the media, is a Bangladeshi national who entered France in 2011 and lodged an asylum application. His application was rejected in 2013, but he was granted a temporary residence permit due to his state of health from 2015 to 2017. In June 2019, the Prefect refused to renew his residence permit and required Mr. Sheel to leave France within 30 days and return to Bangladesh. This decision was overturned by the Administrative Court of Toulouse, which was appealed by the Prefect to the Court of Administrative Appeal of Bordeaux. 

Mr. Sheel suffers from a severe form of asthma and sleep apnea. Throughout his cases, however, the Prefect argued that medical evidence submitted by Mr. Sheel was inadequate to establish that he would not receive appropriate healthcare services in Bangladesh to treat his respiratory disease. He responded that, regardless of where he lived in Bangladesh, he would be unable to access appropriate medication, could not operate respiratory assistance devices in Bangladesh’s hot climate, and would have difficulty avoiding harmful air pollution.

Previous instances

On 15 June 2020, the Administrative Court of Toulouse annulled the decree of 18 June 2019 issued by the Prefect, where he refused to renew Mr. Sheel’s residence permit, ordered him to leave France and return to Bangladesh. The Court also overturned the decision of 5 August 2019 by the Prefect where he refused to grant Mr. Sheel’s request for family reunification with his wife. The Court ordered the Prefect to grant Mr. Sheel a residence permit pursuant to provision 11° of Article L.313-11 of the Code for the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right to Asylum (“Provision 11”) and ordered the State to pay 1,500€ to Mr. Sheel’s counsel.  

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Ioane Teitiota decision, CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016

Date of judgement: 23 September 2020

Court: United Nations Human Rights Committee

Citation(s): CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016; Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2728/2016

Short summary 

In its first ruling on a complaint by an individual seeking asylum from the effects of climate change, the United Nations Human Rights Committee found that states may not deport individuals who face climate change-induced conditions that violate the right to life.

Summary by: Makaela Fehlhaber

Link to original Judgement 

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision 

This decision is significant in that it is one of the first to acknowledge climate change-induced conditions as drivers of asylum claims. The Committee is responsible for holding states to account for upholding the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, however, its decisions are not binding. 

Key facts

The applicant sought asylum (and in the alternative, to be regarded as a protected person) on environmental grounds and argued that this was within the scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 

Further, the applicant contended that deportation back to Kiribati would violate Art. 6 (the right to life) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The applicant sought determination by the Committee on the basis that he had exhausted all available domestic remedies (para. 8.3), a fact not disputed by the State party. 

New Zealand’s primary arguments surrounded the lack of evidence put forth by the applicant to support the argument that there was an imminent risk to his right to life, and that the claim should be deemed inadmissible. 

The Committee was asked to determine whether New Zealand had breached its obligations under the ICCPR by deporting the applicant back to Kiribati on the basis that the evidence did not support a finding that the applicant would face the risk, or would likely face the risk of arbitrary deprivation of life upon his return to Kiribati. 

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Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. The Government of Ireland & Ors.  

Date: 30 July 2020  

Court: Supreme Court of the Republic of Ireland  

Citation(s): [2020] IESC 49 

Short summary  

The Supreme Court of Ireland quashed the government’s National Mitigation Plan to reduce carbon emissions, stating that the Plan was ambiguous in how it would achieve the “national transition objective”, an obligation undertaken by the Irish Government under the Climate Action and Low-Carbon Development Act 2015.  

Summary by: Samyuktha Banusekar

Link to Original Judgement

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

This case was decided by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Ireland, the highest judicial authority in the Republic of Ireland.  

Key facts 

Friends of the Irish Environment (FIE), an advocacy group, filed a petition in the High Court challenging the National Mitigation Plan (“The Plan”) published on 19.07.2017, which was approved by the government and recognized under § 3 of the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act, 2015 (“The Act”). The Plan was alleged to be in violation of the Act, the Constitution of Ireland, and obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), especially with respect to the rights to life and private and family life. FIE stated that the Plan, seeking to transition to a low-carbon economy by 2050, was not consistent with the Act or the commitments that Ireland is obliged to fulfil under the ECHR, mainly due to the fact that it did not seek to cut short-term emissions in a substantial manner.  

Previous instances 

FIE pled before the High Court to either quash the Plan or decide that a new plan be devised. However, the High Court rejected FIE’s argument and ruled in favour of the Government, asserting that the Act had not mandated intermediate targets. The Court also held that the Plan was an initial step in the transition to a low-carbon economy that was to be achieved by 2050, and that neither Ireland’s Constitution nor the ECHR was violated by the Plan. This led to both an application to appeal in the Court of Appeal and an application to appeal directly to the Supreme Court; the latter agreed to hear the case. 

Summary of holding 

In 2020, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court and quashed the Plan. 

Primarily, the Supreme Court observed that § 4 of the Act requires the Plan to specify in what manner the nation will achieve its national transition objective, and that policy measures must concur with this. The Supreme Court held that the Plan must be specific in how the national transition objective is to be achieved by 2050, although the Plan is subject to revision every five years. The Court also attached weight to the opinions of Ireland’s Climate Change Advisory Council, a body established under the Act which tracks policy progress. When the Supreme Court reviewed the Plan, it observed that it fell short of the level of specific instructions that were expected under § 4. The Court also found its policies to be vague and reliant on future investigations. Thus, it was held that the Plan did not comply with the Act and that a new specific Plan should be devised. 

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Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 14

Date of judgement: 20 April 2010

Court: International Court of Justice 

Citation(s): Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 14

Short summary 

The court introduced the concept of binding environmental impact assessments (EIAs) into international environmental laws and further elaborated upon the provisions of the International Law Commission’s draft, as well as the Trail Smelter decision. 

Summary by: Robert Los

Link to original judgement 

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision 

This decision handed down by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) bears immense weight.  

Key facts

In October 2003, the Uruguayan government granted permission to a Spanish Company, ENCE, to build a pulp mill in Fray Bentos on the River Uruguay. Botnia, a Finnish company, then also received environmental authorization to build a mill in February 2005. The River Uruguay forms a border between Argentina and Uruguay and its use is regulated by the Statute of the Uruguay River, a bilateral treaty entered into by the two countries in 1975 (the “Statute“).

Argentina brought a complaint before the ICJ on 4 May 2006, alleging that the Uruguayan government had violated the Statute. Argentina initially sought a provisional measures order from the ICJ to suspend construction of the pulp mills, but this was dismissed. 

Argentina’s principal claims were that: 

  • Uruguay had not complied with the notification and consultation procedure set out in the Statute by authorizing the construction of two pulp mills without the prior consent of Argentina; and 
  • The mills would have an environmental impact upon the river and surrounding areas, and in particular that they would breach Uruguay’s obligation under the Statute to preserve the aquatic environment of the river by failing to protect biodiversity and fisheries.

Argentina consequently sought compensation, an end to construction, and a guarantee of compliance with the Statute in the future.

Uruguay argued that its only obligations had been to inform Argentina, which it had done, albeit after its decision had been made. Furthermore, the technology used would avoid polluting the river, as state-of-the-art waste cleansing equipment – which had been adopted by both the United States and the European Union as the best available technology – was going to be used. This position was supported by an independent World Bank study. 

Summary of holding

The ICJ held that Uruguay breached its procedural obligations by not informing the Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay (“CARU”) of its plans to construct the mills before it issued its environmental authorisations. 

Although Uruguay did notify Argentina, this communication did not take place through CARU and only occurred after the Uruguayan government had issued its authorisations. The ICJ held that, as a result, Uruguay had “disregarded the whole of the cooperation mechanisms provided for in Article 7 to 12 of the…Statute“ (para. 149). In terms of remedy, the ICJ considered that its declaration of breach constituted appropriate satisfaction.

However, the ICJ did not uphold any of the environmental claims made by Argentina. In what is potentially the most important passage of its holding, it stated that the need for an environmental impact assessment (where there is a risk that the proposed activity may have a significantly adverse impact in a trans-boundary context) has gained so much acceptance amongst States that it may now be considered “a requirement under general international law“. (para. 204)

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Juliana v. United States 

Date: 17 January 2020 

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 

Citation(s): Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020)

Short summary  

A group of young people sued the United States government for failing to prevent climate change, seeking an order requiring the government to develop a plan to phase out domestic fossil fuel emissions. The plaintiffs claimed violations of their substantive due process, equal protection, the Ninth Amendment, and the public trust doctrine. The court found that the plaintiffs established injury-in-fact and causation for Article III standing but that their claim failed for lack of redressability. 

Summary by: Nicole Gasmen and Luke Hancox

Link to Original Judgement

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Weight of decision  

This decision comes from the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals and is therefore binding on all courts in the Circuit and persuasive in other federal courts.   

Key facts 

The plaintiffs were twenty-one young citizens, an environmental organization, and a “representative of future generations.” [1165] They sued the President (later dismissed from the action), the United States, and federal agencies. The complaint accused the government of continuing to “permit, authorize, and subsidize” [1165] fossil fuel use, despite awareness of its risks, leading to various climate-change-related injuries. The plaintiffs’ claims varied from psychological harm and impairment of recreational interests to exacerbated medical conditions and property damage. 

The complaint asserted violations of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights: 

“(1) the plaintiffs’ substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) the plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth Amendment to equal protection of the law; (3) the plaintiffs’ rights under the Ninth Amendment; and (4) the public trust doctrine.” [1165] 

The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction ordering the government to implement a plan to “phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric [carbon dioxide].” [1165] 

The court noted that the District Court record and this appeal recognized climate change is occurring at a rapid pace. The court stated that rising carbon emissions would wreak havoc on the Earth’s climate if left unchecked, and that the federal government long understood these risks and affirmatively contributed to their worsening. 

The government largely did not contest the factual basis for the plaintiffs’ claims, only that they lacked standing to pursue them. 

Previous instances  

The District Court denied the government’s motion to dismiss. That court stated that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue their claims that the government violated their constitutional rights, including a Fifth Amendment right to a “climate system capable of sustaining human life.” [1165] The District Court also found a separate viable “danger-creation due process claim” [1165] based on the government’s lack of regulation on third-party emissions and a public trust doctrine claim. 

At summary judgment, the District Court dismissed the President as a defendant and dismissed the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim in part. That court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ Ninth Amendment claims. The government then sought this interlocutory appeal to resolve the standing issue and other grounds for dismissal. 

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Urgenda Foundation v. the State of the Netherlands 

Date: 20 December 2019 

Court: Supreme Court of the Netherlands 

Citation(s): ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007 

Short summary  

The Supreme Court of the Netherlands held that the Dutch State was obliged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 25% by the end of 2020, compared to 1990 levels. This obligation stemmed from the Netherlands’ commitments under the European Convention on Human Rights, including Dutch citizens’ rights to life and respect for private and family life. 

Summary by: Clarrisa Burki

Link to Original Judgement

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

The judgment was handed down by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, the highest judicial body within that nation. It is binding within the Netherlands and compels the government to act. 

Key facts 

The Urgenda Foundation (“Urgenda”), a Dutch environmental group, brought an action to require the Dutch government to take measures to combat climate change. Urgenda based their action on the right to life and the right to a healthy environment. The European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) requires the State to protect these rights for their residents. Article 2 guarantees the right to life and Article 8 ensures the right to respect for private and family life. The European Court of Human Rights has held that the ECHR places an obligation on a State to act and take the appropriate measures when there is a real and immediate risk to people’s lives or welfare and when the State is aware of this. This obligation equally applies when it comes to wide-reaching environmental risks threatening large groups or the population as a whole even if these threats will only materialise over the long term. 

According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), each country is responsible for its own share of emissions; each state is therefore obliged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in proportion to its share of the responsibility. 

In this case, the State asserted that it is not for the courts to undertake the considerations required for a decision on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and that doing so would amount to an order to create legislation, violating the separation of powers. 

Previous instances  

In the District Court, Urgenda sought a court order to order the Netherlands to reduce its emission of greenhouse gasses such that, by the end of 2020, emissions would be reduced by 40% compared to 1990 levels. The District Court upheld the plaintiff’s claim in part and ordered the State to reduce emissions by at least 25% compared to 1990 by 2020.  

The District Court’s order was upheld by the Court of Appeal. 

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RAD File No VB9-03573 

Date: 20 November 2019 

Court: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Appeal Decision 

Citation: [2019] RADD No 2229 

Summary by: Madison Bruno 

Short summary  

The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejected a claim for refugee protection because it found an Internal Flight Alternative (IFA), Port Harcourt, within Nigeria. The Appellant claimed that the RPD erred in its IFA test because the alternate location was unsafe and unreasonable. The Refugee Appeal Board dismissed the appeal but accepted evidence regarding effects of climate change in Nigeria. 

Link to original judgement  

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

The federal Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) gives the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada jurisdiction to hear and decide cases on immigration/refugee matters. Their decisions are persuasive but not binding precedent and are subject to judicial review at the Federal Court. 

Key facts 

Appellant alleged he was attacked by Fulani Herdsmen in 2016, following several altercations over their cattle drinking from his fishponds. He claimed that he was hospitalized for 14 months. Appellant fled Nigeria in 2018, travelled through the U.S., then arrived in Canada to seek refugee protection.  

Canada’s Refugee Protection Division rejected appellant’s initial application for asylum, prompting an appeal to the Refugee Appeal Board. 

Summary of holding 

The Refugee Appeal Board utilized a two-part legal test for assessing whether appellant had a reasonable Internal Flight Alternative (IFA): 

“First, the Board must be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted, and/or no danger of torture, risk to life, or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in the proposed IFA.” (¶ 51) 

“Second, conditions in that part of the country must be such that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, for the claimant to seek refuge there.” (¶ 52) 

“Once an IFA has been identified, the Appellant is responsible for demonstrating that the IFA is unsafe or unreasonable.” (¶ 53) 

The Appeal Board then gave a summary of the documentary evidence regarding Fulani Herdsmen used by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) in its original decision: 

“The NDP [National Documentation Package] states that climate change and insecurity in Nigeria’s northern region have triggered a southward migration of Fulani Herdsmen, resulting in conflict between local farmers and the Herdsmen as they search for land to graze their cattle. The conflicts occur primarily in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, including the states of Adamawa, Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, Taraba, and the Federal Capital Territory.” (¶ 55) 

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Cordella et al. v. Italy

Date: 24 January 2019 

Court: European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg  

Citation: [2019] ECtHR 029 (Application Nos: 54414/13 and 54264/15)

Short summary  

This case held that the European Convention on Human Rights, Articles 8 (Right to respect for private and family life) and 13 (Right to an effective remedy), imposes an obligation on the Italian state to de-pollute areas contaminated by a steel factory.  

Summary by: Yusuf Lahham

Link to original judgement

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) applies the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and all Contracting States are bound by its judgments. As this case originated in an application against the Republic of Italy, the judgment holds the weight of directly applicable constitutional law in Italy. Decisions are also relevant to other States as they are viewed as a ‘living interpretation’ of the ECHR.  

Key facts 

The applicants, over 100 Italian citizens, brought a complaint to the ECtHR on the 29th of July 2013, relying on Articles 2, 8, and 13 of the Convention. The complaint stemmed from the harmful emissions a steel factory was producing, affecting inhabitants of the city of Taranto and its neighbouring municipalities.  

Ilva, a company owned by Riva group, operates the largest steelworks complex in Europe, which is located in Taranto, Italy. The harmful impacts of the complex on the local environment have been noted since 1990, when the Italian Council of Ministers listed certain municipalities around Taranto at “high environmental risk.” Between 1997 and 2017, multiple scientific reports were produced from different departments and investigative authorities, detailing the extent of the impact of the emissions on the local people and environment. Most notably, a 2017 ARPA report confirmed the causal link between industrial emissions and health damage in the areas marked “at risk.”  

In 2003, 2004, and 2006, Ilva agreed to organise measures to reduce the environmental impact of the factory, designating a third party to identify the main source of harmful particle emission and introduce authorised limits for emission levels. Decree no. 155, issued under the Air Quality Directive of 2008/50CE, set the deadline for the limiting of polluting production to December 2012. In 2011, the Ministry of Environment issued an AIA (integrated environmental authorization), allowing the company to continue to produce steel, subject to its adoption of BAT (“best available techniques”) to reduce the impact of polluting emissions on the environment. In 2012, a second AIA was granted, modifying the first and fixing new conditions. From 2012-2016, “salva-Ilva” decree-laws were adopted concerning the activity of Ilva in relation to the “imminent” purchase of the company. This effectively postponed the deadline to execute measures to safeguard the environment until 2023.  

Previous instances 

There were several criminal proceedings brought against the managers of the Ilva company for causing an ecological disaster: the poisoning of food substances, failure to prevent accidents at a place of work, degradation of public goods, and the emission of polluting substances into the atmosphere. Some of these cases resulted in convictions in 2002, 2005, and 2007. Furthermore, the Court of Cassation sentenced the managers of the factory in Taranto for atmospheric pollution and the emission of hazardous particles. It was also noted that the production of the particles at the factory continued, despite the agreements made in 2003 and 2004.  

On 31st of March 2011, the CJEU asserted that Italy had failed to fulfil its obligation under Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament on the prevention and reduction of pollution. It was held that Italy had not adopted necessary measures to ensure industrial plants were being operated in accordance with the regulations provided for in the directive. In 2014, the European Commission called upon the Italian authorities to remedy the pollution issue at the Taranto factory site, noting that the emissions from the steel production process had not decreased and were resulting in serious environmental and health consequences for the local population.  

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Future Generations v. Ministry of the Environment and Others

Date:  5 April 2018 

Court: Supreme Court of Justice of Colombia

Citation(s):  STC4360-2018

Short summary  

25 young plaintiffs sued the Colombian government to stop deforestation in the Amazon rainforest. A 4-3 majority on Colombia’s Supreme Court ruled for the plaintiffs – finding that their and future generations’ fundamental rights were threatened by loss of biodiversity and climate change – and ordered the Colombian government to stop deforestation by 2022, which it failed to do.

Summary by: Saw Aung Aung and David Cremins

Link to Original Judgement

Click here to open the case in PDF format

Weight of decision  

The Supreme Court of Justice is the final arbiter of constitutional questions in Colombia and its ruling is binding on both government and private actors. However, compliance issues following the ruling in Future Generations highlight the limits of the Court’s power..   

Key facts 

Between 2015 and 2016, deforestation in the Amazonas region of Colombia increased by 44%. This poses a risk not just to the region but to the world, as the Amazon acts as the “lungs of the earth” and is critical to global sustainability; deforestation impacts water supplies, degrades soil health, and increases carbon emissions.

This rapid increase in deforestation was in part caused by the end of hostilities between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, which created a power vacuum in rural areas of the country. Small farmers, large ranchers, and corporations alike began clearing rainforest rapidly to make room for agriculture, ranching, and mining, and the state was largely powerless to stop this trend.

Colombia, as a signatory to the 2015 Paris Agreement and other international mechanisms, has obligated itself to reach net zero emissions. However, as is true around the world, limited progress has been made towards these goals.

Dejusticia, a social justice non-profit based in Bogotá, grew concerned about the deforestation and the climate crisis. So, they brought together 25 young people, ranging in age from 7 to 25 years old, as plaintiffs in a tutela action – directly asserting a violation of their individual constitutional rights to life, health, water, food, and a healthy environment – in Colombia’s Constitutional Court system in January 2018.

Previous instances  

The first court to hear this case dismissed the complaint on standing grounds, holding that the plaintiffs’ claim was collective, rather than individual, and therefore not properly pled as a tutela action; the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of Colombia.

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