This danger to the individual’s life can depend on socio-environmental conditions, not solely armed conflict. These socio-environmental factors include human action, provided that the context is in a specific area which seriously jeopardizes the survival of the individual and their relatives.
The Court instructed trial judges to establish an “essential level, below which decent living conditions are not recognizable and, therefore, no the fundamental right to life of the individual is ensured” (¶ 6). The trial judge must then verify the effective assurance of this minimum threshold. This involves assessing contexts of armed conflict, as well as other circumstances that pose a serious risk to the survival of the individual and their families, such as conditions of social, environmental, or climatic degradation, or contexts of unsustainable exploitation of natural resources.
Here, this specific and broad verification was lacking. The Court of Ancona acknowledged the existence of environmental disaster conditions; however, they limited their final assessment to solely the presence of armed conflict, thereby failing to assess all factors that could cause IL to need humanitarian protection.
Potential takeaways for future climate migration litigation
- The Court determined that, if during the trial judge’s assessment for granting humanitarian protection, the situation in the country of origin does not allow for a minimum guarantee of the right to life, then humanitarian protection should be granted. Crucially, this assessment must now include environmental and climactic factors which influence an individual’s decision to leave their home.
- In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied in part on the Teitiota decision from the United Nations, wherein a citizen of Kiribati failed to establish a claim for political asylum in New Zealand due to imminent danger from climate change impacts. The Teitiota court, nonetheless, affirmed that environmental degradation can imperil a right to life when a government is unable or unwilling to guarantee “access to essential natural resources, such as arable land and drinking water” (¶ 3). This indicates that, at least in European courts, a persuasive body of national and international case law is being developed that will hold precedential authority in future climate migration cases.