The court made an interesting comment on this provision when it stated that there was no direct violation of Art. 20a GG in the present instance. Art. 20a GG places the state under an obligation to take climate action and is aimed at achieving climate neutrality. Climate action does not take absolute precedence over other interests. In cases of conflict, it must be balanced with other constitutional interests and principles. However, given that climate change is currently deemed to be almost entirely irreversible, any behaviour that leads to an exceeding of the critical temperature threshold for achieving the constitutional climate goal would only be justifiable under strict conditions – such as for the purpose of protecting fundamental rights. Within the balancing process, the obligation to take climate action is accorded increasing weight as climate change intensifies.
The court emphasizes that a flight to the sea of world community responsibility is not an adequate argument for one’s own inaction. Rather, the principle of common yet individual responsibility is perpetuated:
“The obligation to take climate action arising from Art. 20a GG is not invalidated by the fact that the climate and global warming are worldwide phenomena and that the problems of climate change cannot therefore be resolved by the mitigation efforts of any one state on its own.” (para. 198)
The open normative content and the broad scope of application of the issue of climate change in no way preclude constitutional court review of compliance with the climate protection requirement; Art. 20a GG is a justiciable legal norm. In this context, the binding Paris Agreement represents a permissible constitutional concretization.
In addition, the court clarifies the requirements for scientific evidence and at what threshold it contains an indication of political action:
“[…] if there is scientific uncertainty regarding causal relationships of environmental relevance, Art. 20a GG places constraints on the legislator’s decisions – especially those with irreversible consequences for the environment – and imposes a special duty of care on the legislator, including a responsibility for future generations. This special duty of care finds expression in the fact that the legislator must even take account of mere indications pointing to the possibility of serious or irreversible impairments, as long as these indications are sufficiently reliable.” (para. 229)
The court then finds the violation of intertemporal liberty rights:
“[…] one generation must not be allowed to consume large portions of the CO2 budget while bearing a relatively minor share of the reduction effort if this would involve leaving subsequent generations with a drastic reduction burden and expose their lives to comprehensive losses of freedom. At some point in the future, even serious losses of freedom may be deemed proportionate and justified under constitutional law in order to prevent climate change. This is precisely what gives rise to the risk of having to accept considerable losses of freedom. However, since the current provisions on allowable emission amounts have now already established a path to future burdens on freedom, the impacts on future freedom must be proportionate from today’s perspective. […] the objective duty of protection arising from Art. 20a GG encompasses the necessity to treat the natural foundations of life with such care and to leave them in such condition that future generations who wish to continue preserving these foundations are not forced to engage in radical abstinence.” (para. 192, 193)
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